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For over thirty years Ernest van den Haag repeatedly asserted a controversial claim 
in favour of the death penalty. He argued that, regardless of the extent to which 
capital punishment sentences are unequally, arbitrarily, or even racially, 
maldistributed among offenders, capital punishment is always a morally valid 
sentence in se. His controversial claim is rooted in the theory of retributive justice, as 
he appeals to the offender's individual moral desert to justify capital punishment for 
the crime of (first-degree) murder. Thus, van den Haag summarised his claim into a 
logical axiom – that unequal justice (i.e. capital punishment) is always preferable to 
equal injustice (i.e. abolitionism or life imprisonment). Van den Haag challenged 
abolitionists to refute his axiom by using his same retributive foundation. This is 
something abolitionists have been unable to do without resorting to consequentialist 
or hybrid reasoning. This theoretical dissertation has sought to find the flaws in van 
den Haag’s logic and dispute his axiom on his own retributive grounds utilising, 
particularly, racial maldistribution of capital sentences. In this dissertation four 
attempts are made to dispute his axiom and the following arguments are identified: 
(i) an internal inconsistency within van den Haag’s axiom; (ii) an argument for an 
implicit illegitimate authority, as well as (iii) an argument for an explicit illegitimate 
authority; and finally, (iv) an argument concerning the subjective experience of the 
offender when presented with a sentence of death. It is, however, the final argument 
that carries the most weight in disputing van den Haag’s axiom. Thus, this 
dissertation has met his challenge by rendering the death penalty immoral in itself, 
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The allure of retribution to justify punishment is undoubtedly as ancient as 
the notion of punishment itself (whereby, retributive principles will be discussed 
more fully in Chapter II). Even those who shun systems that adhere to retributive 
punishment may acknowledge that humankind’s basic moral intuition – that 
individuals deserve to be punished for wrongdoings they have committed – should 
be adopted in some way or another for the purpose of maintaining social order. An 
additional appeal of retributivism is that it acts as a counter-position to 
consequentialist justifications of punishment, where one can punish the innocent if 
the overall outcome would be positive for the society. Although an intuitive notion 
of desert may not be an entirely persuasive or a sufficient justification for 
punishment, it is hard to accept that retribution has no justificatory weight. 
Retribution does not justify punishment of any and all kinds. Particular kinds 
of punishment, such as torture, are impossible to justify even by ascribing to 
retributive principles. Retribution is not taken merely as an act of vengeance here. 
Instead, retribution is understood as a moralistic reaction to harm inflicted by a 
wrongdoer, paying tribute to the very idea of what is just (Moore, 1995). One may 
note Herbert Morris’s prominent description of retribution. Morris (1968) explicated 
that: 
A person who violates the rules has something the others have – the 
benefits of the system – but by renouncing what others have assumed, 
the burdens of self-restraint, he [sic] has acquired an unfair advantage. 
Matters are not even until this advantage is in some way erased. (p. 
478) 
Thus the infliction of punishment is deemed a method in which the improper 
benefit gained by the offender is expunged in order for the universal moral fabric, 
order or system, to revert to a state of equilibrium. However, if the aim of 
retributivism is to rectify the moral balance then acts that are inherently immoral, 
such as torture, will hinder the achievement of that aim. Hence, only the infliction of 












This aspect – the morality of punishment – reveals part of the perennial death 
penalty debate and is the focus of this work (to be explored more fully in Chapter 
III). The aspect of the death penalty focused on here is the inherent morality or 
immorality of capital punishment. Is it morally sound to state that some crimes – 
such as first-degree murder in the American legal context or murder in the South 
African legal context – are so heinous that only death at the hands of the state can 
rectify this societal infringement; or is the death penalty in se an immoral 
punishment regardless of the severity of the crime? Abolitionists argue the latter for 
several reasons. In this dissertation, however, the core argument posited is that the 
death penalty is an unacceptably immoral form of punishment due to the arbitrary or 
maldistributed nature of capital sentences for offenders. 
The idea that capital punishment is constitutionally, if not morally, 
unacceptable has been argued in numerous court decisions; however, the most 
pertinent cases shall be mentioned in this dissertation (Chapter III). The notion that 
arbitrary or maldistributed death sentences are unconstitutional were argued in 
Furman v. Georgia (1972) which, in effect, abolished the use of capital punishment 
in most of the United States of America (U.S.), and was similarly used in State v. 
Makwanyane (1995), which abolished capital punishment in South Africa (S.A.). 
Moreover, those claiming that punishment is immoral and unjust due to the 
maldistribution of sentencing among wrongdoers often cite racial bias as the most 
compelling motivation for that maldistribution. This is reminiscent of the McCleskey 
v. Kemp (1987) case. Abolitionists argue that as racial discrimination is evidenced to 
exist in capital sentencing, thereby causing a racist maldistribution of death 
sentences, this form of punishment is an unacceptably immoral and unjust form of 
punishment. 
In contrast, Ernest van den Haag, a staunch advocate for the death penalty for 
several decades, used retributive reasoning as a counter-argument (Chapter IV). He 
claimed that although maldistributed sentences due to racial discrimination (or other 
forms of prejudice) are wrong, the death sentence in itself is not shown to be 
immoral and unjust. The reason is that, although some (first-degree) murderers will 
not be punished appropriately for their crime, at least some of those who deserve to 












Van den Haag emphasised that desert pertains to the individual, and as 
punishment is an individual matter, one that does not pertain to races, nationalities, 
sexes, and so on (see also Reed, 1999; Reuther, 1996), the only pertinent moral 
concern is determining which individuals deserve punishment and imposing that 
punishment. For instance, if there were five wrongdoers all of whom deserved death 
as a punishment, but only one wrongdoer received it, the wrongdoer so punished was 
not treated unjustly nor was the penalty immoral because the others were not chosen. 
Rather, the only injustice was that the other four wrongdoers did not receive the 
punishment they deserved. 
For van den Haag, then, it is not the maldistribution of punishment that 
creates the injustice, but rather the failure to impose punishment on as many 
wrongdoers as possible. So, as a higher degree of injustice is ultimately brought 
about by abolishing the most appropriate punishment, there is no logical reason why 
the death penalty in itself is immoral or unjust and thus should be abolished. Hence 
van den Haag’s axiom is that regardless of the maldistribution of capital sentencing 
for (first-degree) murderers (i.e. unequal justice) it is always preferable to abolishing 
(or replacing with life imprisonment) the most appropriate sentence, even if its 
distribution were theoretically equal (i.e. equal injustice). 
The notion of individual desert provides van den Haag with a strong and 
logical retributivist justification for his argument in favour of capital punishment as 
paraphrased in his axiom. However, the idea that the death penalty would still be 
considered a moral and just form of punishment despite it being distributed in an 
arbitrary or even racist manner is deeply controversial. Nonetheless, if van den 
Haag’s argument is valid then a system of capital sentencing, regardless of any 
maldistribution and racial discrimination (Liebman, Fagan, & West, 2000), delivers 













For decades van den Haag challenged abolitionists to demonstrate flaws in 
his logic. Abolitionists have to date been unsuccessful in meeting this challenge 
without referring to consequentialist or hybrid reasoning – and van den Haag insisted 
as a main pre-condition that any valid challenge to his axiom cannot make use of 
such reasoning. The aim of this dissertation, then, is to meet van den Haag’s 
retentionist challenge by readdressing the philosophical and moral value of his 
argument and axiom: that unequal justice is always preferable to equal injustice. 
Van den Haag, in fact, claimed that his axiom was irrefutable (see van den Haag, 
1986; van den Haag & Conrad, 1983). 
The core argument, then, is that in a situation of unequal justice van den 
Haag violates his own retributive principles and therefore defines capital punishment 
as retributively immoral and unjust in itself. The infliction of such a morally 
unacceptable sentence would hinder the rectification of the moral balance – the aim 
of retributivism and van den Haag. Retributive principles, however, have on 
countless occasions defended his axiom against abolitionist attacks. As such, four 
attempts to challenge van den Haag’s axiom – without deviating from his main pre-
condition – are made in this dissertation. If this dissertation is able to render the 
death penalty as immoral in se, on the same retributive foundation as van den Haag, 
his axiom would thus be challenged. This dissertation, then, is a retributive argument 
in favour of abolitionism or life imprisonment (i.e. equal injustice) as opposed to the 












This dissertation is a theoretical exploration. The development of retribution 
is traced in order to define the underlying theoretical principles applicable to van den 
Haag’s axiom. Scholarly literature and legislative materials in relation to capital 
punishment, maldistributed sentences and racial discrimination are examined. On 
occasion empirical information will be presented, but only when it affects theoretical 
concepts. A clear exposition of van den Haag’s position will be followed by an 
analysis of his axiom in order to demonstrate philosophical and theoretical flaws 
based solely on the theory of retribution. 
Van den Haag’s axiom will be challenged by the utilisation and modification 
of existing arguments, as well as the development of new ones, in order to advance 
theory in this area of criminology and jurisprudence. Four arguments will be 
presented in ascending order of strength: (a) an internal contradiction will first be 
sought within van den Haag’s logic to prove maldistributed punishments, in general, 
are unjust on retributive grounds (Chapter V); (b) secondly, an attempt will be made 
to show that the judicial authority becomes implicitly illegitimate and therefore 
unable to morally impose the death penalty as it is perceived by the public to ignore 
issues of racism, or even indirectly endorse racism, in capital sentencing (Chapter 
VI); (c) further, the importance of a legitimate authority to impose just capital 
sentences is philosophically and concretely explained and such judicial authority is 
demonstrated as an explicitly illegitimate source due to a direct violation of its 
mandate for impartiality (Chapter VII). This is an extensive argument and the 
response to it is provided in Chapter VIII. Finally, (d) the argument will be put 
forward that van den Haag knowingly violates the lex talionis principle – a vital 
component for retributivism – by readily dismissing the notion of subjective 
experiences by some individuals sentenced to death (Chapter IX). The chapters in 
this dissertation, unlike those of an empirical study, are ordered by a logical 
relationship rather than by chronology. The next chapter will extrapolate the theory 















II.I. The Fusion of Legal and Moral Theory 
What does a legislative sentence have to do with morality? It is important to 
note for obvious reasons that this dissertation does not maintain the position that 
what is legal is automatically deemed morally legitimate. A stronger connection is 
required and provided. Legislative punishment attempts to punish in a reasonable 
way those who have broken the law. Although traditionally this outlook is accepted, 
what is viewed as reasonable punishment is questionable. 
The practical implementation of punishment needs to be justified on moral 
grounds because punishment, being an intentional and preventable infliction of harm 
(Honderich, 1970), is itself ‘immoral’ (Duff & Garland, 1994). Punishment 
necessitates the reduction of individual liberty which, without some agreeable form 
of legislation, is even more quickly deemed morally iniquitous (Cavadino & Dignan, 
1997; Hart, 1963; Sullivan, 1996). 
Although there is perpetual disagreement about the factors involved in 
distributing and determining appropriate individual sentences (Mill, 1867), 
agreement on punishment in general as a legitimate practice requires an underlying 
moral foundation. Thus moral theory provides the benchmark for the practical 
implementation of judicial sentences, often encompassing its purpose and expected 
outcome (Duff & Garland, 1994; Hart, 1968a; Morris & Tonry, 1990). 
Moreover, it is common for officials in the criminal justice system, such as 
judges, juries and prosecutors, to justify their decisions by making reference to 
purposes extracted from moral theory. Moral theories used in the context of judicial 
punishment can be referred to as moral legal theories. Although there is a clear 
association between legal theory and moral theory in general, which moral theory of 
punishment should be used – and when – is unclear. In this dissertation the moral 
legal theory of punishment that is applied is deontological retributivism, as it is the 













II.II. Consequentialism and Deontology 
There are numerous moral philosophies that may provide alternative 
theoretical perspectives to legal punishment. These perspectives provide alternative 
views as to the reason for, and expected outcomes of, punishment. Commonly, the 
philosophical and theoretical debate of punishment has been largely shaped by the 
contrast between consequentialism and deontologicalism. For this reason the scope 
of this dissertation does not include other moral philosophies such as feminism’s 
ethics of care (Gilligan, 1982; Held, 1993, 2005), Aristotelian virtue ethics 
(Hursthouse, 1999; Pojman & Fieser, 2009), egoism (Rand, 1964), and altruism 
(Seglow, 2004). The most vital difference between the two aforementioned moral 
constructs is their temporal approach to wrongdoing and punishment. 
 
II.II.I. The Consequentialist Perspective 
Consequentialism is a forward-looking approach. Consequentialists justify an 
action based on the measure of potential (utility or) beneficial social effects derived 
from its outcome (Broad, 1930). For a consequentialist act to be morally just, the 
utility gained must outweigh the overall disutility of imposing that act. Thus 
consequentialist theories are commonly known as utilitarian theories. 
Some scholars discern a version of utilitarianism as reductivism due to its 
predominance with reducing criminal activity (Cavadino & Dignan, 1997; Walker, 
1985). Concerning legal punishment, reducing, deterring and preventing criminal 
acts is the aim (or utility) of utilitarianism. There are several legal theories that 
achieve these ends, such as general and individual deterrence, rehabilitation, and 
incapacitation (see Russell, 2007; Sim, 2009, Zimmerman, 2004; Zimring & 
Hawkins, 1995). Although these theories are not the focus of this dissertation, 
consequentialism is important to understand in order to identify forbidden 
consequentialist counter-arguments against van den Haag. In direct juxtaposition to 













II.II.II. The Deontological Perspective 
Deontologicalism is a backward-looking approach. For deontologists, the 
moral correctness or incorrectness of an act rests on the act itself and not on any 
potential future outcomes resulting from that action (Broad, 1930). One common 
deontological approach to punishment is retributivism. Retributivism is retrospective 
and thus strictly non-consequentialist. Retributive punishment has an intrinsic moral 
worth when acting as a counterbalance to past wrongdoings without the justification 
of potential future outcomes (Duff, 1996). 
So, from a retributivist point of view, the practical implementation of 
punishment is deserved, just, and a morally correct act as it repairs the moral fabric 
or balance that was disrupted by the criminal act, and is thus often called just deserts 
(Cavadino & Dignan, 1997; von Hirsch, 1976, 1992). The focus of this dissertation, 
however, is the determination of the validity of deontological retributive punishment 
as a justifiable moral argument favouring the death penalty, particularly when 
sentences are maldistributed along racial lines. 
 
II.II.III. Hybrid Theories 
Retributive and consequentialist or utilitarian theories can merge to create 
hybrid or mixed theories of punishment (von Hirsch, 1993; Walker, 1991). Hybrid 
theories of punishment are appealing and thought-provoking substitutes for pure 
forms of retributivism and utilitarianism. However, these hybrid theories tend not to 
provide any fundamentally new developments for the original theories (Edney & 
Bagaric, 2007). The attraction of using these theories is drawn from controlling one 
theory’s reasoning with that of another. Because van den Haag’s challenge is rooted 
in pure retributivism, hybrids, like consequentialist arguments, are also not permitted 
as valid counter-arguments. 
 
II.III. A History of Retribution 
There seems a natural human propensity for retribution – where ‘the 
punishment must fit the crime’. In the past, most cultures or nations have ascribed to 












harshness of the offence. One can uncover retributive principles expressed as far 
back as in the Old Testament, written between 1100 and 100 BCE (“Old Testament”, 
2009). Both Deuteronomy 19:21 and Exodus 21:24 refer to the manner in which 
punishment should be measured: “eye for [an] eye, tooth for [a] tooth, hand for [a] 
hand, foot for [a] foot” (Revised Standard Version). 
Moreover, the idea that punishment can be quantified to ensure justification 
is noted elsewhere. For instance Matthew 7:2 in the New Testament states: “with the 
measure you use, it will be measured to you” (Revised Standard Version), and in the 
Babylonian Talmud, the phrase middah keneged middah is directly translated into 
“measure for measure” (Epstein, n.d., para. 7). Both refer to an ancient lex talionis 
principle of retribution, and are considered the ‘Golden Rule’ of morality and ethical 
punishment (Kohler & Hirsch, 2002). 
One can trace legalised retributive doctrine even further back to an extant 
seven foot slab of basalt stone from Babylon dated 1760 BCE, known as the Codex 
(or Code of) Hammurabi (Mieroop, 2004). Even more is the oldest intact code of 
law, being the Sumerian Code of Ur-Nammu created in 2750 BCE (Kramer, 1963). 
According to Samuel Noah Kramer, the renowned Assyriologist, this codex has in it 
the oldest inscribed capital sanction against murder, as the first law translated is: ‘If a 
man commits a murder, that man must be killed’ (Kramer, 1981). 
The point made here demonstrates how ancient van den Haag’s retributive 
appeal to justify executing murderers is. Moreover, all the laws in the Codex 
Hammurabi are inscribed casuistically, thus if X commits crime C, X deserves 
punishment P. Not only was this structure considerably advanced for its time, so too 
was the less rigid (or proportional) interpretation of the lex talionis principle. For 
example, where murder was punishable by death, acts of bodily harm were 
punishable by fines and not by an arranged assault upon the offender by the legal 
authorities (Hammurabi, trans. 2005). Similarly, although van den Haag claimed 
murderers deserved to be executed, he did not adhere to a literal lex talionis for every 















II.IV. Lex Talionis: Literal Adoption and Proportional Adaptation 
As Kant (1797/1996) so poignantly stated: 
For the only time a criminal cannot complain that a wrong is done 
him [sic] is when he brings his [sic] misdeed back upon himself [sic], 
and what is done to him [sic] in accordance with penal law is what he 
[sic] has perpetrated on others, if not in terms of its letter at least in 
terms of its spirit. (p. 130) 
Retributive theory maintains that the wrongdoer’s actions justify not only the 
punishment but the degree of punishment imposed. Commonly, the lex talionis 
principle is the primary core retributive argument for any particular sanction. The 
idea that an individual deserves to receive a punishment equal to the harm that was 
suffered by his or her victim does not sound absurd. However, if one where 
attempting to impose a literal version of the lex talionis stringently, the outcome may 
be quite bizarre. 
 
II.IV.I. Outcomes of Literal Lex Talionis 
The lex talionis ‘eye for an eye’ principle needs to be adapted to ensure that 
moral desert and punishment are commensurate. The use of the literal interpretation, 
in which offenders deserve – and can only morally receive – the punishment 
equivalent to what the victim suffered, is highly problematic. First, applying this 
principle can at times be conceptually difficult for reasons such as an absence of a 
victim or the nominal nature of the crime. For instance, circumstances of reckless 
endangerment or tax fraud seem difficult to equivalently impose on the offender 
(Davis, 1986). 
Secondly, the imposition of an equivalent punishment may be literally 
impossible. An arsonist who has no property or a kidnapper who has no children 
cannot be punished equivalently (Daube, 1947). Thirdly, some punishments appear 
morally insalubrious, such as raping a rapist, particularly a child molester, or dealing 
with someone who engages in bestiality. Even if these punishments were equivalent 
and so technically appropriate, re-structuring judicial sentencing in this manner, 













Fourthly, to equivalently administer moral desert, numerous criminal justice 
procedures may need to be reconsidered. For instance, suspended or reduced 
sentences, executive pardons or clemency, and statutes of limitations may need to be 
revised (Shafer-Landau, 2000). Moreover, the rules for collecting evidence would 
conflict with a literal lex talionis when the evidence demonstrated the guilt of the 
perpetrator, but that evidence was improperly gathered (Shafer-Landau, 2000). 
Lastly, in cases such as genocide what equivalent punishment is there? 
Although for Kant “every murderer … must suffer death [for there to be] justice” 
(Kant, 1797/1996, p. 107), what punishment balances out atrocities by Nero (37-68) 
(Champlin, 2003), Stalin (1878-1953) (Rayfield, 2005), Hitler (1889-1945) (Waite, 
1993), and ‘Pol Pot’ (1925-1998) (Short, 2005)? Even though Kant suggested 
banishment and social isolation (bürgerlichen Gesellschaft) as a fate worse than 
death for crimes against humanity (Verbrechen an der Menschheit) (Kant, 
1797/1996, p. 130; see also Napoleon’s preference for execution in Robinson, 1906), 
this is impractical and morally questionable, such as quarantining each individual 
perpetrator for acts of genocide on their own uninhabited island with no basic human 
rights provision for sustenance or shelter (Fichtelberg, 2005). 
 
II.IV.II. Shifting to Proportional Lex Talionis 
It is safe to say that most retributivists, even those that support capital 
punishment like van den Haag, discard a literal lex talionis for a proportional one. 
Here the wrongdoer deserves to be punished by a measure approximate to the harm 
caused (Murphy, 1979). This notion has its own difficulties in determining the extent 
of approximation. 
Attempts to create punishment based on interpersonal measures of harm by 
calculating similar suffering endured (as opposed to using the same type of act as the 
wrongdoer) have inevitably failed (see Reiman, 1985). For instance, Robert Nozick 
and Joel Feinberg both developed unsuccessful means to establish a measure of 
deserved punishment based on the culpability of the wrongdoer and the harshness of 
the crime (Feinberg, 1995; Nozick, 1981). It is not necessary to discuss the details of 
their equations or lists of criteria, respectively, in this dissertation. The purpose is 












punishment is unclear and problematic – and even more so when a literal version of 
lex talionis is applied. 
Retributivists may be able to justify punishment in a broad sense but their 
arguments seem to lack strong philosophical instruction for the implementation of 
specific punishments (see Moore, 1997). This is the point at which some have 
introduced hybrid theories of punishment. However, Jeffrie Murphy (1979), a 
contemporary retributivist, sweeps this aside, as does this dissertation: 
Surely the principle [lex] talionis, though requiring likeness of 
punishment does not require exact likeness in all respects. There is no 
reason in principle (though there are practical difficulties) against 
trying to specify in a general way what the costs in life and labour of 
certain kinds of crime might be, and how the costs of punishments 
might be calculated, so that retribution could be understood as 
preventing criminal profit. And it is certainly possible retributively to 
rank punishments so that the most serious punishments are matched 
with the most serious offenses. (p.79) 
So, if retributivism utilises the lex talionis literally in order to justify 
punishment, its application in respect of certain crimes such as culpable homicide 
may make the theory absurd. If retributivism does not hold any form of lex talionis 
to justify punishment, the theory is baseless, as it would have difficulty justifying 
any penalties (Finkelstein, 2002). This means that it is not necessary for the 
punishment and the offence, to match exactly, but the degree of punishment must be 
reasonably matched to the severity of the wrongdoing. Hence, the lex talionis as used 
in retributivism can be adopted as: The more severe the offence, the more severe the 
punishment. Thus, the most severe offence must be met with the most severe 
punishment. 
 
II.V. Basic Retributive Principles 
Although the core lex talionis principle of retributivism has been discussed, 
there are many versions of retributivism. Hart’s ‘crude model’ demonstrates three 
basic underlying principles that are common for a multitude of retributive theories, 
including that of van den Haag (Hart, 1968a). It is appropriate, here, to interpret 
Hart’s underlying principles to retributivism from a Kantian perspective as this is the 












perspectives, such as that of Hegel, which is not mentioned here (see Beiser, 1993, 
for a collection of essays; Hegel, 1821/1967). 
 
II.V.I. The Principle of Wilful Wrongdoing 
Hart’s first principle asserts that the justification of the punishment of a 
wrongdoer resides in the extent to which a wrongdoer can be blamed for his or her 
actions and willingness to commit the action (Hart, 1968a). Hence, a rational 
individual may justly incur punishment only if his or her actions were knowingly and 
intentionally harmful. This, of course, raises issues with regards to acts of negligence 
but these are beyond the scope of this dissertation. 
As non-rational beings are not considered to have wilfully, knowingly and 
intentionally caused harm, they are not subject to the same requirements for 
punishment. As such, the non-rational beings that may fall into this category are 
animals, children or minors, persons with mental disabilities, and persons with 
psychological impairments. The severity level of the last two may require some 
discussion, but not in this dissertation. 
This abstract principle, above, is seen in practical legal cases. In Atkins v. 
Virginia (2002), for instance, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled the execution of persons 
with mental disabilities to be unconstitutionally “cruel and unusual” (p. 321), and, 
that “within the world community, the imposition of the death penalty for crimes 
committed by mentally [disabled] offenders is overwhelmingly disapproved” (p. 
316). Similarly, in Roper v. Simmons (2005), the U.S. Supreme Court ruled the death 
penalty unconstitutional for offenders under the age of 18 (minors) (p. 1198). In this 
case, Justice Kennedy stated that: 
Whether viewed as an attempt to express the community’s moral 
outrage or as an attempt to right the balance for the wrong to the 
victim, the case for retribution is not as strong with a minor as with an 
adult. Retribution is not proportional if the law’s most severe penalty 
is imposed on one whose culpability or blame-worthiness is 
diminished, to a substantial degree, by reason of youth and 
immaturity. (Roper v. Simmons, 2005, p. 1196) 
18th century philosopher of epistemology, metaphysics, ethics and logic, 
Immanuel Kant (1724-1804), stressed the importance of this particular principle with 












essays). He placed emphasis on the wilfulness of an individual and the rationality 
that solidifies the use of that will (or autonomy). Kant (1785/1993) stated that: 
Every rational being, exists as an end in himself [sic] … not merely as 
a means to be arbitrarily used by … [the] will [of others]. He [sic] 
must in all his [sic] actions, whether directed to himself [sic] or … to 
other rational beings, always be regarded at the same time as an end 
…. [R]ational beings are called persons in as much as their nature 
already marks them out as ends in themselves …. (p. 36) 
 
II.V.II. The Principle of Proportionality 
Hart’s second principle indicates that the kind and severity of the punishment 
is correlated to the will of the offender (Hart, 1968a). As the offender has willed the 
crime he or she has willed the punishment. Hence, there must be some kind of 
equivalence between the punishment and the imposition of will, or rather, the 
offence. 
The manner in which the punishment is matched with the wrongdoing tends 
to depict the version of retributivism applied. Kantian retributivism, for instance, is 
based on the ‘equality principle’. Kant (1797/1991, as cited in Anderson, 1997) 
described a just quotient of punishment as follows: 
But what kind and what amount of punishment is it that public justice 
makes its principle and measure? None other than the principle of 
equality … to incline no more to one side than to the other. 
Accordingly, whatever undeserved evil you inflict upon another 
within the people … you inflict upon yourself. If you insult [another], 
you insult yourself; if you steal from [another], you steal from 
yourself; if you strike [another], you strike yourself; if you kill 
[another], you kill yourself. (para. 5) 
He further states that “only the law of retribution … can specify the equality 
and the quantity of punishment” (Kant, 1797/1996, p. 105). Kant suggests then that 
the severity of the wrongdoing ought to be equivalent to the severity of the 
punishment. This is reminiscent of the lex talionis principle, mentioned earlier, 
whereby the punishment’s severity must increase with the severity of the offence, 
and thus, the most severe offences must be met with the most severe punishments. 
However, this principle highlights the fact that offenders should not receive less 
punishment than they deserve nor receive more punishment than they deserve, for 












II.V.III. The Principle of Inherent Justice 
The third principle is fundamentally dissimilar to consequentialism. This is a 
declaration that it is in itself just to punish those who have intentionally committed 
wrongdoings, regardless of the potential social benefit or loss (Hart, 1968a). Kant 
(1797/1996) explained that: 
Punishment by a court … can never be inflicted merely as a means to 
promote some other good for the criminal … or for civil society. It 
must always be inflicted upon [them] only because [they have] 
committed a crime …. [They] must previously have been found 
punishable before any thought can be given to drawing from his [sic] 
punishment something of use for himself [sic] or his [sic] fellow 
citizens. (p. 105) 
When the wrongdoer intentionally and wilfully commits an offence, he or she 
understands a priori their act to be an offence. So punishing the wrongdoer gives 
credence to the rationality of that person, and places due emphasis on the importance 
of that person’s existence. The offender is not viewed as the means whereby the 
social order will be repaired; a precarious being that needs force to be restrained or 
healed (Hegel, 1821/1967), or an individual ‘to be made an example of’, but rather, 
one who deserves to have his or her will respected. This notion of retributive justice 
is the foundation of van den Haag’s axiom and challenge. 
 
II.V.IV. The Principle of the Necessity of Punishment 
Although in Hart’s ‘crude model’ there are three basic underlying principles, 
a fourth principle is also added and applicable to a Kantian version of retribution, in 
what Hart discerns as the ‘severe model’ of retribution (Hart, 1968a). This principle 
asserts that it is not only acceptable and inherently just to punish offenders, but it is 
mandatory – failure to do so brings about injustice (Hart, 1968a). Kant (1797/1965, 
as cited in Anderson, 1997) argued that: 
Even if a civil society were to dissolve itself by common agreement 
of all its members (for example, if the people inhabiting an island 
decided to separate and disperse themselves around the world), the 
last murderer remaining in prison must be executed, so that everyone 
will duly receive what his actions are worth and so that the bloodguilt 
thereof will not be fixed on the people because they failed to insist on 












regarded as accomplices in this public violation of legal justice. (para. 
12) 
For Kant and van den Haag, then, punishment is mandatory. In-depth 
discussions of Kantian perspectives are unnecessary here. However, the brief outline 
that has been given is important, as this dissertation implicitly and, at times, 
explicitly refers to the principles above to meet van den Haag’s challenge. 
 
II.VI. Basic Social Contractarian Principles 
Retributive theory is often considered an appealing theory of punishment as 
individuals are held morally accountable. Also, judicial institutions that distribute 
penalties display recognition of individuals’ agency. However, scholars have cited 
retributive theory as a mere validation of vengeful behaviour, a non-deontological 
undertone. Most retributive theorists and contemporary political philosophers sought 
to mete out this assertion by underlining retributive theory with social 
contractarianism (Murphy, 1978; Murphy & Hampton, 1988). 
 
II.VI.I. The Natural Equality Principle 
Like basic retributive principles, social contractarian theory comes in many 
forms and has basic common underlying principles. The first principle indicates that 
all humans are innately equal, but the conception of that equality differs depending 
on the theorist. For instance, the 17th century political philosopher Thomas Hobbes 
(1588-1679) maintained that humans are equal because all humans are equally 
susceptible to danger from one another (see Malcolm, 2002). Hobbes (1651/1985, as 
cited in Anderson, 1997) claimed that: 
When all is reckoned together, the difference between [one another] is 
not so considerable …. [Regarding] the strength of body, the weakest 
has strength enough to kill the strongest, either by secret machination, 
or by confederacy with others …. And as to the faculties of the mind 
… I find yet a greater equality among men, than that of strength. For 
prudence, is but [life experience]; which equal time, equally bestows 
on all men, in those things they equally apply themselves unto. (para. 
17) 
Additionally, the 17th century philosopher John Locke (1632-1704) placed 












original ‘state of nature’, where no individual has more or less power, control or 
prestige than anyone else (Waldron, 2002). Locke (1690/1988, as cited in Anderson, 
1997) suggested that: 
To understand political power right, and derive it from its original, we 
must consider what state all [people] are naturally in, and that is, a 
state of perfect freedom to order their actions, and dispose of their 
possessions, and persons as they think fit, within the bounds of the 
law of nature, without asking leave, or depending upon the will of any 
other [person]. A state also of equality, wherein all the power and 
jurisdiction is reciprocal, no one having more than another. (para. 18) 
The point made here is the same. Humans are inherently equal whether it is 
due to our equal susceptibility to harm or due to our common desire to be treated as 
having equal rights, and freedom from the domination of others. So, no individual or 
institution has the moral authority to legitimately enslave a select group of citizens or 
be free from laws when others must adhere to them (see Rawls, 1971). 
 
II.VI.II. The Mutual Benefit Principle 
The second common underlying principle for social contractarianism asserts 
that a governing body, and particularly a criminal justice system, is an organism of 
accumulated social rules and / or laws that benefit the constituents of a society in a 
mutual way. The purpose of adherence, and what the rules and / or laws constitute, 
varies between social contractarian theories. For instance, in a Hobbesian society, the 
rules and / or laws are mandatory because they are mutually beneficial (Hobbes, 
1651/1985). 
Alternatively, in a Lockean society, the rules and / or laws are mutually 
beneficial and mandatory, but the obligation to adhere to them is not due to them 
being mutually beneficial (Locke, 1690/1988). Rather, all the members of a society 
would agree to implement and adhere to reasonable mutually beneficial social rules 
and laws, as well as a legitimate authority to police the constituents, in the 
hypothetical ‘original position’. This means that when a social structure or governing 
body comes into existence, citizens could not know their potential financial position, 
career prospects, physical attributes, health status, and the like, while shrouded by 












The reasonable and impartial nature of such a governing body is that each 
individual is advantaged and disadvantaged. The advantages include those gained in 
any regulated society, such as safety and security of property and self (see Hobbes, 
1651/1985; Locke, 1690/1988). Disadvantages include the limitations placed on any 
nihilistic and hedonistic intentions. Thus, for each individual, agency is propelled 
within the society to develop one’s passions but is restrained by social order. It is the 
combination of the above two contractarian principles that express why retributive 
justice is not mere revenge, but is a deontological means for legislative punishment. 
 
II.VII. Concluding Retributive Theory 
For the retributivist, the rationale of legislative punishment as well as the 
criterion for designing and implementing judicial institutions, policy and laws, is that 
wrongdoers receive their just deserts. As such: 
Judicial punishment can never be used merely as a means to promote 
some other good for the criminal … or for civil society, but instead it 
must in all cases be imposed on him [sic] only on the ground that he 
[sic] has committed a crime. (Martin, 2005, p. 174) 
This pays tribute to the rationality, will, and existence of the offender. The 
punishment must also be proportionate to their crime (Hampton, 1991; Kleinig, 
1973; McCloskey, 1965; Nozick, 1981). So, sentencing is morally justified if, and 
only if, the more severe offences are met with the more severe punishments and the 
punishment is not more or less than the wrongdoers deserve (Rachels, 2007).  
As a clearer understanding of the intricacies of retributivism has been 
established, the next chapter introduces and links retributivism, capital punishment 
and racial discrimination within the context of American and South African law. 
Reference to both S.A. and the U.S. is deliberate as (i) capital punishment has been 
utilised in both countries and (ii) both share a comparable history of racial 
discrimination, segregation and ideology (see Fredrickson, 1981; Hamilton, Huntley, 
Alexander, Guimarāes, & James, 2001; Kende, 2006; see also Banks, 2003; Dubow, 













CAPITAL PUNISHMENT AND RACIAL DISCRIMINATION 
 
III.I. Introducing Capital Punishment 
Capital punishment, also known as the death penalty, is a judicial judgment 
following which an individual citizen is executed by the state or country. The 
offences that the courts deem worthy of capital punishment are often termed ‘capital 
offences’ or ‘capital crimes’. The word ‘capital’ is from the Latin capitalis, literally 
meaning, ‘concerning the head’. Thus, capital offences were traditionally punished 
by beheading the perpetrator. For instance, on 10 October 1789 at the height of the 
French Revolution a method of ‘humane’ execution – later to become extremely 
popular – whereby a device for beheading persons, consisting of a weighted blade set 
between two upright posts, was proposed by and named after physician Joseph-
Ignace Guillotin (1738-1814) (Kershaw, 1993). 
In almost every society capital punishment has been practiced by various 
means. Methods of execution have included stoning, beheading, hanging, drawing 
and quartering, the electric chair, the gas chamber and lethal injection. Currently, 
legal use of the death penalty varies among countries and states. For example, in 
1950, the Council of Europe adopted the Convention for the Protection of Human 
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, also known as the European Convention on 
Human Rights (ECHR), whereby, Article 2 affirmed the ‘right to life’, and Protocol 
13 called for the complete abolition of the death penalty – which was implemented in 
most of Europe (see Council of Europe, 1950). The United States still uses capital 
punishment sporadically, in some states, while South Africa has banned this practice 
entirely. The position of the U.S. and S.A. with regards to the death penalty will be 
discussed in this dissertation due to their common use of capital punishment and 
comparable history of racial discrimination. 
 
III.II. Debating Capital Punishment 
The array of divergent country and state death penalty practices highlights 












use of capital punishment in general will not be debated here, but rather the 
controversy surrounding it will be outlined briefly. Those who seek to end capital 
punishment or keep the sanction banned are called abolitionists. Those who seek to 
retain the death penalty or re-instate it are called retentionists. 
Some retentionists argue that capital punishment acts as a stronger deterrent 
from criminality than life imprisonment (see Brumm & Cloninger, 1996; 
Dezhbakhsh, Rubin, & Shepherd, 2003; Dezhbakhsh & Shepherd, 2006; Keckler, 
2006; Mocan & Gittings, 2003; Sorensen, Wrinkle, Brewer, & Marquart, 1999; 
Yang & Lester, 2008; Yunker, 2002). Abolitionists respond that life imprisonment 
can be an equally effective deterrent (see Berk, 2005; Donohue & Wolfers, 2005, 
2006; Fagan, 2006; Public Policy, 2005, Weisberg, 2005). 
Some abolitionists argue that capital punishment can irreversibly execute 
innocent individuals (see Amnesty International, 2008; Death Penalty Information 
Center, 2009; Dieter, 2004). Moreover, they argue that the financial cost of life 
imprisonment is less than that of the death penalty, while retentionists argue to the 
contrary (Zimmerman, 2004; see Kasten, 1996, for an extensive explanation). 
Furthermore, some abolitionists hold that advocating murderous sentences may 
induce violent inclinations in jurors, officials and general society. This is known as 
the ‘brutalisation hypothesis’ (see Cochran, Mitchell, & Seth, 1994; Sorensen et al., 
1999; Thompson, 1997). 
Others argue that capital punishment negates the value, respect and dignity 
attributable to human life (Devine, 2000). However, retentionists suggest that only in 
ending the life of a murderer is the sanctity and dignity of (the victim’s and 
sometimes the offender’s) life affirmed (Koch, 1985). Abolitionists argue that the 
government or state has no inherent right or authority to violate a wrongdoer’s right 
to life (Winston, 2002), and others argue that capital sentencing is arbitrarily 
distributed or maldistributed due to various gender, religious, social, and racial 
biases (Holcomb, Williams, & Demuth, 2004; Lanier & Acker, 2004; see also 
Calvert, 1992; Davis, 1997). Some retentionists, on the other hand, use biblical or 
literal retributivism as a moral justification to execute (first-degree) murderers in the 












There are numerous considerations to contend with in assessing and 
critiquing capital punishment, not merely individually but also in combinations (see 
Bedau, 1999). However, the primary considerations for this dissertation are 
retributivist justifications for capital punishment, and arbitrary distribution and racial 
maldistribution in capital sentencing. 
 
III.III. Public Consensus and Capital Punishment 
Due to the multiplicity of arguments supporting or rejecting the death 
penalty, public desire to retain or abolish the death penalty is typically not fixed. For 
instance in abolitionist countries, such as in Jamaica and Sri Lanka (see Dias, 2004; 
Richards, 2008), heinous attacks of terrorism or grisly murders have terminated the 
moratorium on capital punishment. Alternatively, in retentionist countries, 
moratoriums on capital punishment were often attributed to shifts in political rule 
from authoritarian to democratic, such as in South Africa. In the United States, 
however, some states have banned the death penalty, Michigan being the first in 
1847; while others, such as Texas, currently administer capital punishment (see 
Bonner & Fessenden, 2000). 
Additionally, public opinion on the death penalty tends not to be one-sided 
within an abolitionist or retentionist country or state. For example, between 1996 and 
2000 public support for capital punishment declined from a longstanding 75 per cent 
to an approximate 65 per cent in the U.S. (Gross & Ellsworth, 2003, p. 11). 
Moreover, a 2005 Gallup Poll conducted in the U.S. reported that 64 per cent 
supported capital sentencing for murderers. This was found to be the lowest 
percentage of approval in 27 years (Saad, 2005). 
This reduction in support for the death penalty can also be seen in specific 
groups for which capital sentencing is repealed, such as juveniles or persons with 
mental disabilities. Although some have attributed this decline to increased media 
portrayals of innocent individuals being executed, others attribute the drop in 
American public support to the view that capital punishment is an ineffective 
deterrent (see Dardis, Baumgartner, Boydstun, De Boef, & Shen, 2008; Fan, Keltner, 












stating that the death penalty has no deterrent effect on murder, an increase of 21 per 
cent from 1991 (Death Penalty Information Center, 2004). 
Despite the decline of support in the U.S., the majority view still tends to 
favour the use of capital punishment. For instance, a survey conducted in 2006 by 
ABC News reported that 65 per cent of Americans favoured the death penalty. This 
figure was found to be consistent in the light of other 2000 ABC News surveys 
(ABC News/Washington Post, 2006). Moreover, a 2006 American Gallup Poll 
indicated that 60 per cent considered the application of capital punishment as fair 
while 51 per cent of the public believed that capital sentencing should be used more 
frequently (Gallup Poll, 2006a, 2006b). Furthermore, in a recent American Gallup 
Poll from 2008 approximately 64 per cent favoured capital punishment for 
murderers, with 30 per cent against, and five per cent undecided (Gallup Poll, 2008). 
Correspondingly, South African opinion on the death penalty has, for many 
years, been largely in favour of its use. In fact, 71 per cent of the general population 
polled supported the return of capital punishment in 1997 (Bentele, 1998; Hunter-
Gault, 1999). Even in the court case that finally ended the application of the death 
penalty in South Africa, the Attorney General stated that for crimes of heinous 
murder, the South African public did not consider capital punishment an inhumane 
or cruel punishment (State v. Makwanyane, 1995, p. 431, para. 87; see also Bentele, 
1998). 
Moreover, 72 per cent of South Africans polled favoured re-instating the 
death penalty in 2006 (Angus Reid Global Monitor, 2006), and in 2007, Judge 
Dennis Davis commented that 85 per cent of those polled wanted the death penalty 
re-instated (D’Angelo, 2007). Furthermore, in 2008, 35 000 people voted on the 
issue during a television news broadcast. Of these, 98 per cent of South Africans 
voted in favour of re-instating capital punishment (“Should the death penalty”, 
2008). The divide in public consensus in the U.S. and S.A. demonstrates the ever-
present controversial nature of capital punishment. The controversy is stirred further 
as in both countries public opinion statistically favours a sanction that may have 














III.IV. Capital Punishment, Racial Discrimination, and the United States 
In the U.S. racial discrimination can be seen in capital sentencing in various 
ways. For instance, the prosecutor may select defendants for the death penalty based 
on their race. This can be seen in its application in the past decade in the state of 
Georgia, for when the victim was white (as opposed to black) the likelihood of the 
prosecutor requesting capital punishment was doubled (see Tucker, 2007). 
Moreover, there tends to be a higher rate of executions occurring for those 
who murder white individuals as opposed to situations when the victim is black. For 
example, a 2003 Amnesty International report noted that in the U.S. since 1977, 80 
per cent of those who received the death penalty had murdered white individuals 
(Amnesty International, 2003). Furthermore, the fact that black individuals are 
executed disproportionately to the black population group, as opposed to white 
individuals to the white population group, may suggest an element of racial 
discrimination within capital sentencing (Blumstein, 1982; Gross & Mauro, 1989). 
 
III.IV.I. The Furman Case: Arbitrary Distribution 
In America, the landmark case of Furman v. Georgia (1972) dramatically 
reduced the mass use and misuse of the death penalty. In the U.S., the Fifth 
Amendment to the Constitution of the United States permits the deprivation of life 
for “capital … crime[s]” (“Fifth Amendment”, 2009, para. 1). However, in this case 
the Supreme Court found, in a 5-4 per curiam decision, capital punishment to be 
unconstitutional because it violated the “cruel and unusual” clause in the Eighth 
Amendment to the Constitution of the United States by distributing capital sentences 
in an arbitrary manner (“Eighth Amendment”, 2009, para. 1; Furman v. Georgia, 
1972, pp. 344-345). 
Justice Marshall, along with Justice Brennan, considered capital punishment 
to be unconstitutional in virtually every respect, as he spoke of, for example, a 
negligent deterrent effect from the death penalty as well as potentially innocent 
individuals being executed (Furman v. Georgia, 1972, pp. 362-369). However, the 
two main issues focused on in this dissertation are retributivism and (racial) 
maldistribution. Justice Marshall dismissed the execution of murderers by equating 












Punishment for the sake of retribution [is] not permissible under the 
Eighth Amendment …. At times a cry is heard that morality requires 
vengeance to evidence society’s abhorrence of the act. But the Eighth 
Amendment is our insulation from our baser selves. The ‘cruel and 
unusual’ [phrase] … limits the avenues through which vengeance can 
be channelled. Were this not so, the language would be empty and a 
return to the rack and other tortures would be possible in a given case. 
(Furman v. Georgia, 1972, pp. 344-345) 
Although this dissertation does not agree with Justice Marshall’s colloquial 
use of ‘retribution’ (see Chapter II), it does agree with his parallel opinion to Justice 
Stewart on the arbitrary distribution or (racial) maldistribution in capital sentencing. 
Justice Stewart noted that: 
These death sentences are cruel and unusual in the same way that 
being struck by lightning is cruel and unusual. For, of all the people 
convicted of … murders[,] … the perpetrators are among a 
capriciously selected random handful upon whom the sentence of 
death has in fact been imposed .… [I]f any basis can be discerned for 
the selection of these few to be sentenced to die, it is the 
constitutionally impermissible basis of race. But racial discrimination 
has not been proved, and [so Justice Stewart] put it to one side. 
[Justice Stewart concluded] that the Eighth and the Fourteenth 
Amendments cannot tolerate the inflicting of a sentence of death 
under legal systems that permit this unique penalty to be so wantonly 
and so freakishly imposed. (Furman v. Georgia, 1972, pp. 309-310) 
 
III.IV.II. The Gregg Case: Public Opinion 
After the ruling in Furman v. Georgia (1972) numerous states ended capital 
punishment while many others amended laws concerning it. For instance, the state of 
Georgia reduced the number of capital crimes (Gregg v. Georgia, 1976, pp. 162-
168); reviewed all death sentences for emotional bias; and guaranteed that sentences 
were proportionate to other similar offences (Gregg v. Georgia, 1976, pp. 166-168). 
These revisions were believed to address the issue of the arbitrary sentencing or 
(racial) maldistribution as referred to in Furman, so as to constitutionally justify the 
use of the death penalty (Gregg v. Georgia, 1976, p. 195). This notion of removing 
maldistributed sentences to retain capital punishment is reflective of the disguised 
equal distribution response in Chapter VIII. That chapter will highlight the 
immorality of an arbitrary or racially maldistributed capital sentence as distinctly 












In the Gregg v. Georgia (1976) case, public opinion was incorporated into 
the Court’s decision concerning the death penalty. The Court stated that under the 
Eighth Amendment ‘cruel and unusual’ is reflective and reliant on the “evolving 
standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society” (Gregg v. 
Georgia, 1976, p. 173). In Gregg v. Georgia (1976), the Court decided that the death 
penalty did not violate these standards as the Fifth Amendment indicated that “the 
existence of capital punishment was accepted by the Framers” (p. 177), and since 
Furman, many states have re-instated capital punishment (pp. 179-187). The extent 
to which the public’s voice can or should influence judicial authorities is interesting 
to note, as this is the theme of the implicit illegitimate authority argument in Chapter 
VI. That chapter will argue that judicial authorities must abide by the majority view 
of the public to maintain social order. If the majority of the public perceive capital 
sentencing to be arbitrarily or racially maldistributed, the public’s discontent is 
enough to render the judicial authority as illegitimate, and thus the capital sentence 
to be an illegitimate punishment. 
 
III.IV.III. The McCleskey Case: Racial Discrimination 
The McCleskey v. Kemp (1987) case is considered vital regarding racial 
discrimination and sentence maldistribution in capital punishment. During a robbery 
Warren McCleskey, a black perpetrator, murdered a white police officer and was 
sentenced to death (McCleskey v. Kemp, 1987, p. 283). McCleskey’s defence argued 
that the state of Georgia displayed systematic racial discrimination in capital 
sentencing and that this violated the Equal Protection Clause in the Fourteenth 
Amendment to the Constitution of the United States (McCleskey v. Kemp, 1987, p. 
292). The Equal Protection Clause says that “[n]o state shall ... deny to any person 
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws” (“Fourteenth Amendment”, 
2009, para. 1). 
The defence utilised the famous ‘Baldus study’, which demonstrated that a 
black male who murders a white individual is 4.3 times more likely to be executed 
than a black male who murders a black individual (Baldus, Pulaski, & Woodworth, 












sentence of death was not directly attributed to this defendant due to racial bias 
(McCleskey v. Kemp, 1987, pp. 286-299). 
Moreover, Justice Brennan concurred that the capital sentence for McCleskey 
should stand because “recognition of McCleskey’s claim would open the door to 
widespread challenges to all aspects of criminal sentencing” (McCleskey v. Kemp, 
1987, p. 339, see also pp. 315-318). It is interesting to note here that the length to 
which racial discrimination in capital sentencing can extend within the criminal 
justice system or even within the state is commented on in several sections of the 
explicit illegitimate authority argument in Chapter VII. That chapter seeks to 
determine the judicial authority in cases of capital punishment as illegitimate, and 
thus the sentence as illegitimate, as the authority exceeds his or her mandate of 
impartiality. Chapter VII questions the extent to which an illegitimate sentence can 
affect the legitimacy of the entire criminal justice system or beyond; the interplay 
between legitimating capital sentences and judicial discretion; and the role of 
unintentional, as opposed to intentional, racial bias in capital sentencing. 
 
III.V. Capital Punishment, Racial Discrimination, and South Africa 
As in the United States, racial discrimination also appeared in capital 
sentencing in South Africa (Hamilton et al., 2001; Kende, 2006; see also Bouckaert, 
1996; Higginbotham, 1978; Jackson & Jackson, 1998; Johnson, 1985; Turrell, 2000, 
2004). Unlike in South Africa, however, U.S. jurisprudence concerning the death 
penalty has taken a circuitous path to reach its current point, as opposed to the single 
State v. Makwanyane (1995) case. A brief historical overview of the death penalty in 
S.A. shall be mentioned.  
In the 17th century, the Dutch Republic and its East India Company (DEIC) 
established a refreshment station for voyagers sailing between the DEIC’s main 
settlement at Batavia in Java and the Netherlands, under the command of Jan van 
Riebeeck, at the Cape of Good Hope in Table Bay (Fredrickson, 1981). This later 
developed into a settlement which necessitated the introduction of legislation, 
including the use of capital punishment for crimes such as murder and treason 
(Bouckaert, 1996, p. 288). The Union of South Africa which was part of the British 












In 1948 the Afrikaner-dominated National Party (NP) became the governing 
political party following a whites-only general election. During the course of the 
following decades the National Party through legislation refined the concept of 
apartheid, meaning ‘separateness’, and imposed on South Africa policies pertaining 
to racial group classifications; homeland, educational, and medical segregation; and 
black-labour control (Fredrickson, 1981). In 1962 Parliament declared terrorism and 
sabotage to be capital crimes and, until 1990, capital punishment could be imposed 
for a wide range of violent and serious crimes, such as rape, kidnapping, and robbery 
with aggravating circumstances (Bouckaert, 1996, p. 291). 
In 1963 former President of South Africa, Nelson Mandela, a leader of the 
African National Congress (ANC), a liberation movement, was charged with treason 
along with other defendants in the famous Rivonia Trial. It was anticipated that 
Mandela and his co-defendants would receive the death penalty from Justice Quartus 
de Wet (Mandela, 1995). They were successfully defended by Arthur Chaskalson 
who was assisted by Bram Fischer, George Bizos, and Joel Joffe, and given long 
prison sentences instead (Mandela, 1995, p. 159). Coincidently, 30 years later, 
Chaskalson – who served between 1994 and 2001 as the first Judge President of the 
newly-established Constitutional Court – oversaw the abolition of capital 
punishment with the ruling in State v. Makwanyane (1995) (see Klug, 2003). 
During the years of apartheid, capital punishment was used as a political 
device to hinder resistance (Bouckaert, 1996; Turrell, 2004). According to Holt 
(1989): 
Capital punishment in South Africa has been … a tool specifically for 
controlling and punishing opponents of apartheid. These motivations 
are particularly evident in the state’s treatment of accused members of 
banned liberation movements. In 1983, for instance, the execution of 
three convicted [ANC] combatants was [intentionally] timed to 
coincide with the seventh anniversary of [the 1976 Soweto] uprisings 
[as a reminder and warning to those who oppose the apartheid 
regime]. (p. 303) 
Capital punishment was not only used as a means to curb political opposition 
to apartheid, in conjunction with other legislation such as the Prohibition of Mixed 
Marriages Act (1949) and the Group Areas Act (1950), but also, according to Turrell 












For instance, Bouckaert (1996) noted a 1988 Amnesty International study that 
indicated: 
During a one-year period [in South Africa], [47] percent of the blacks 
convicted of murdering whites were sentenced to death, compared to 
no death sentences for whites convicted of murdering blacks and only 
two and a half percent for blacks convicted of killing blacks. One 
observer estimate[d] that between 1910 and 1975, [27] times as many 
blacks as whites were executed. (p. 293) 
Bouckaert (1996) suggested that the apartheid regime’s use of capital 
punishment in this manner furthered national and international protest against that 
government. For instance, member states of the British Commonwealth forced South 
Africa to withdraw as a member in 1961 due to racial policies, and in 1985, the 
governments of Great Britain and United States enforced certain economic sanctions 
because of the apartheid system (Robinson, n.d.). Racial discrimination played a 
large role in establishing new guidelines for judicial discretion and restricted the 
imposition of capital punishment from 1990. For instance, Section 277 of the 
Criminal Procedure Act (1977) was amended by Section 4 of the Criminal Law 
Amendment Act (1990), which altered the minimum age for execution from 16 to 18 
years. Moreover, the last execution by the South African government took place in 
November 1989, so a de facto moratorium on executions was in place (State v. 
Makwanyane, 1995, p. 402, para. 6). Furthermore, bans on political opposition 
movements were lifted in 1990 (see Mandela, 1995). 
The old Constitution of the Republic of South Africa of 1983 was amended 
to eliminate racially discriminatory clauses. Thus, the Interim Constitution of the 
Republic of South Africa of 1993 attempted to provide “a historic bridge between 
the past of a deeply divided society characterized by strife, conflict, untold suffering 
and injustice, and a future founded on the recognition of human rights, democracy 
and peaceful co-existence and development opportunities for all South Africans, 
irrespective of colour, race, class, belief or sex” (Postamble section). This led to the 
current Constitution of the Republic of South Africa of 1996, the result of 
considerable negotiation, input from members of the public and the deliberations of 













III.V.I. The Makwanyane Case: Ending Capital Punishment 
In State v. Makwanyane (1995) the Court considered the U.S. Supreme Court 
rulings in Furman v. Georgia (1972) and Gregg v. Georgia (1976). This case noted 
that the Fifth Amendment “impliedly recogni[s]es [the] validity” of capital 
punishment (Kronenwetter, 2001, p.270). However, unlike Furman, the South 
African Interim Constitution (1993) neither prohibited nor authorised state 
executions. So, in order to determine the South African death penalty’s 
constitutionality, the Court sought to determine whether Section 277(1)(a) of the 
Criminal Procedure Act (1977), which endorsed the validity of capital punishment 
for murderers, was compatible with the Interim Constitution (1993). 
In State v. Makwanyane (1995), the Court stated that there was virtually no 
difference between the standard of guided discretion mentioned in Greg and that 
which is described in Section 277 of the Criminal Procedure Act (1977). Guided 
discretion refers to statutory guidelines, such as the identification of mitigating and 
aggravating factors relevant to the determination of a sentence, which attempt to 
channel the discretion of sentencing authorities, in order to determine appropriate 
punishments, and remain consistent when allocating capital punishment. However, 
the South African Constitutional Court, unlike the U.S. Supreme Court, still 
considered guided discretion to be inadequate and unsatisfactory to justify the death 
penalty due to incongruent sentencing on racial and socio-economic status lines. 
Like Furman, the Court deemed that arbitrary death sentences were “cruel and 
inhumane” (State v. Makwanyane, 1995, p. 421, para. 55; see also Stevenson, 2002). 
The Court deemed that arbitrary distribution, and racial maldistribution, of 
capital sentences violated the Interim Constitution (1993), where “no person shall be 
subject to torture of any kind, whether physical, mental or emotional, nor shall any 
person be subject to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment” (s. 
11(2)). Justice Chaskalson noted that: 
Of the thousands of persons put on trial for murder, only a very small 
percentage are sentenced to death by a trial Court, and of those, a 
large number escape the ultimate penalty on appeal. At every stage of 
the process there is an element of chance. The outcome may be 
dependent upon factors such as the way the case is investigated by the 
police, the way the case is presented by the prosecutor, how 












attitude to capital punishment of the trial Judge and, if the matter goes 
on appeal, the particular Judges who are selected to hear the case.…. 
Race and class are [also] factors that run deep in our society and 
cannot simply be brushed aside as no longer being relevant [to capital 
sentencing]. (State v. Makwanyane, 1995, pp. 418-419, para. 48) 
The South African Attorney General argued for capital punishment on the 
grounds of deterrence, prevention, and retribution. First, the Attorney General stated 
that the crime rate had radically increased since the moratorium on capital 
punishment, and concluded that the death penalty had been an effective deterrent 
(State v. Makwanyane, 1995, p. 442, para. 118). The Court, however, concluded that 
it would be “facile to attribute the increase in violent crime during this period to the 
moratorium on executions” (State v. Makwanyane, 1995, p. 443, para. 119). 
Secondly, prevention was readily dismissed as the Constitutional Court 
deemed “imprisonment … sufficient for the purpose of prevention in the 
overwhelming number of cases in which there are murder convictions … [where] 
death sentences are imposed” (State v. Makwanyane, 1995, p. 445, para. 128). 
Thirdly, the Court deemed that S.A. had moved passed retribution (meant in the 
colloquial sense of revenge like Justice Marshall in Furman) (State v. Makwanyane, 
1995, pp. 445-446, para. 129). 
The Court considered all the arguments opposing or favouring capital 
punishment and contended that when “taken together … capital punishment [is] 
cruel, inhuman and degrading” (State v. Makwanyane, 1995, p. 448, para. 135). So, 
in State v. Makwanyane (1995), the South African Constitutional Court ruled that 
capital punishment was unconstitutional (p. 453, para. 151). 
 
III.VI. Concluding Capital Punishment and Racial Discrimination 
In this chapter the issue of capital punishment and important American and 
South African case law was introduced. Also mentioned, was how arbitrary 
distribution, particularly due to racial maldistribution of capital sentences, relates to 
the history of death penalty jurisprudence in these countries. The major difference 
between these countries, however, is that the Constitution of the United States 
explicitly condones capital sentencing whereas the South African Constitution does 












constitutionally protected value into their judgments, whereas the South African 
Constitutional Court had to decide whether or not capital sentences should be a 
constitutionally protected value. 
The current unconstitutionality of the death penalty may change in South 
Africa’s future. South African President Zacob Zuma, along with other leaders from 
this nation’s most influential political parties, have spoken publically about a 
referendum to the South African Constitution to re-instate and use the death penalty 
(see Nduru, 2006; Nieuwoudt, 2008). If the South Africa Constitutional Court, in 
future, discusses re-instating capital punishment, van den Haag’s view regarding the 
death penalty, among other considerations, should be presented. In the next chapter, 
theoretical retribution, capital punishment, arbitrary sentencing, and racial 
maldistribution (as described in Chapters II and III, respectively), are discussed 













ERNEST VAN DEN HAAG’S POSITION 
 
IV.I. The Importance of Being E(a)rnest 
Ernest van den Haag (1914-2002) was a Dutch-American sociologist and 
professor of jurisprudence and public policy. Van den Haag spent most of his early 
years in Italy where he was nearly assassinated by Mussolini’s regime for being a 
left-wing activist (M. E. Grenander Department of Special Collections and Archives 
[M. E. Grenander], 2005). In 1937 he was placed in solitary confinement, remaining 
there for close to two years (Nash, 2003). He later escaped from Italy to France 
which was then occupied by the Nazis. 
  In the 1940s he fled to America where he wrote hundreds of articles for the 
National Review and gave countless lectures and court testimonies to U.S. House 
and Senate subcommittees, the International Court of Justice, and the U.S. Supreme 
Court (see M. E. Grenander, 2005). He covered issues such as labour relations, 
Marxism, homosexuality, pornography, legalising drugs, philosophy, and legal and 
social theory. He also authored numerous books such as Education as an Industry 
(1956), The Fabric of Society (1957), The Jewish Mystique (1969), Political 
Violence and Civil Disobedience (1972), and Punishing Criminals: Concerning a 
Very Old and Painful Question (1975). 
As expansive as his knowledge was, van den Haag was infamous for two 
issues, of which only the second will be discussed. First, in the 1960s he was in 
favour of racial segregation in schools, noting psychological damage integration may 
cause (see Stell v. Savannah-Chatham County Board of Educ., 1963). Secondly – 
and the subject of this dissertation – he was a staunch defender of the use of capital 
punishment, regardless of the amount of arbitrary sentence distribution and racial 
bias (van den Haag, 1986; van den Haag & Conrad, 1983). Considering van den 
Haag’s earlier leftist political viewpoint and constant encounters with extreme right-
wing radicals in his youth, his unwavering stance in favour of the death penalty is 
somewhat ironic (see Gosse, 2005). It is, however, the thought involved or manner 












IV.II. Van den Haag’s Axiom 
Van den Haag’s notoriety is encapsulated by his perpetually stated axiom that 
one should always choose unequal justice over equal injustice (van den Haag, 1986; 
van den Haag & Conrad, 1983). He conceived that any rational society would always 
have a preference for employing a system of justice where deserved punishments are 
unequally distributed (i.e. unequal justice) as opposed to a system where deserved 
punishments are abolished in favour of an equal distribution (i.e. equal injustice) 
(van den Haag & Conrad, 1983). 
In terms of the death penalty he asserted that rational individuals (see Chapter 
II) should always advocate for (first-degree) murderers to receive the death penalty 
even if only some of these murderers were eventually executed (i.e. unequal justice). 
Van den Haag maintained that this view was exceedingly more preferable to an 
abolitionist criminal justice system where not a single (first-degree) murderer 
received what he or she deserved, namely, capital punishment (i.e. equal injustice). 
Van den Haag propelled this axiom against abolitionists in numerous death penalty 
debates. 
 
IV.II.I. Equal Distribution 
For the retributivist van den Haag, the superlative notion of equal justice 
meant that justice was constantly distributed equally – that every guilty (first-degree) 
murderer deserving of the death penalty receives it in each capital case. However, 
van den Haag accepted that the unequal distribution of deserved punishments was 
realistically inescapable (see Black, 1974). He did, however, consider an unequal 
distribution of deserved punishments far more preferable than a criminal justice 
system completely void of a capital sentence which alternatively distributed deserved 
punishments for the crime of (first-degree) murder. 
According to van den Haag, if one were to create an equal distribution by 
abolishing capital punishment, where no murderers received their just desert, their 
guilt and the need for justice remained unchanged (see Moore, 1997). If, in an 
unequal distribution, some murderers did not receive a capital sentence, “the guilt of 
the executed convicts would not be diminished, nor would their punishment be less 












distributive form, the guilt and the need for offenders to receive their just desert does 
not alter. 
As such, notions of desert and justice are more likely to be met with a 
distribution that is unequal (i.e. unequal justice), as opposed to non-existent (i.e. 
equal injustice), in a system that cannot guarantee every murderer receiving their just 
desert (i.e. equal justice). So, even though van den Haag does not reject the 
significance of equality for retributivism (see Furman v. Georgia, 1972, p. 247, 
where Justice Douglas quoted van den Haag), distributive and equality principles are 
secondary and less morally significant than the concept of justice. An intricate 
discussion of the links between justice and equality is beyond this dissertation, as 
van den Haag’s challenge must be met on the basis of his retributive idea of justice 
(see Cohen, 2008; Dworkin, 1981; Kymlicka, 2002; Miller & Walzer, 1995; 
Nietzsche, 1878/1996; Rawls, 1971). 
 
IV.II.II. Unequal Distribution 
For van den Haag, an unequal distribution of capital sentencing is not all-
inclusive and just in any circumstance. What could be termed misdistribution was 
the selection of innocent individuals for sentencing based on arbitrary biases. This 
was considered unjust by van den Haag. However, it is not the character of the 
punishment, being the death penalty, which automatically perpetuates injustice here. 
Rather, it was the punishment of the innocent that was intuitively and morally unjust, 
as they would receive a penalty which they did not deserve (van den Haag, 1986). 
The unequal distribution of capital punishment, or maldistribution, refers 
only to those individuals guilty of their crimes, where the wrongdoers are unequally 
selected for the death penalty based on arbitrary biases. Some of the factors that can 
invoke bias in sentencing may include the gender, religion, nationality, culture, 
ethnicity, socio-economic status, or race of the defendant or victim. Van den Haag 
does not consider this to be unjust (van den Haag, 1986). 
For van den Haag, and other like-minded retributivists, if the death penalty 
were immoral in itself, then there would be no distributive principle that could render 
it a moral act. Similarly, if capital punishment were a moral act in itself, even if 












this absurd and groundless distribution still does not render capital punishment 
immoral, nor make any individual punishment unjust (van den Haag, 1986). So, for 
van den Haag, “[m]aldistribution of any punishment among those who deserve it … 
is irrelevant to its justice or morality” (van den Haag, 1986, p. 1663). 
 
IV.II.III. Racial Maldistribution 
The moral value of the death penalty is commonly questioned when the issue 
of racial discrimination arises in the maldistribution of capital sentencing. However, 
van den Haag gave little recognition or indulgence to increasing evidence of racially 
distributed death sentences (Reiman, 1985). For van den Haag, punishments were 
meted out to individuals, and not to specific racial groups. The only significant 
consideration was whether the executed individual deserved the punishment. 
For van den Haag, if only white wrongdoers were given life imprisonment 
without the possibility of parole, and only black wrongdoers were executed, capital 
punishment would still be moral and just (van den Haag, 1986). As van den Haag 
states: “Discrimination must be abolished by abolishing discrimination – not by 
abolishing penalties” (van den Haag & Conrad, 1983, p. 223). So, if wrongdoers of a 
particular racial group endure capital sentencing more than those from another 
group, distribution simply needs to be equalised. 
 
IV.III. Van den Haag’s Axiomatic Assumptions 
Before arguments against van den Haag’s controversial position are raised, it 
is important to note three assumptions regarding his axiom. First, this dissertation 
seeks to challenge van den Haag’s axiom on his conservative or pure version of 
retribution which, he claimed, could not be done (see van den Haag, 1987). As such, 
the main pre-condition for this challenge is that consequentialist and hybrid 
reasoning is forbidden (see Alexander, 2002; McCloskey, 1965; Murphy, 1994; 
Pace, 2002). 
Secondly, this work assumes, as did van den Haag, a traditional non-
comparative approach to punishment and desert. The difference between the 












but the detailed application of a comparative approach to punishment and desert is, 
however, beyond the scope of this dissertation. Thirdly, it is assumed that, in 
general, the punishment an offender deserves is proportional to the seriousness of the 
offence and the culpability of that offender (see Duff, 1996; Kelly, 2002; Rawls, 
1971; Scheffler, 2000), and specifically, that capital punishment is deserved for 
(first-degree) murder.  
As van den Haag’s axiom and assumptions have been explained, arguments 
aimed at meeting van den Haag’s challenge, and defining capital punishment as 
retributively immoral and unjust in itself, commences from the next chapter onward. 
Although it is only at this stage that counter-arguments against van den Haag can 
ensue, contextualising this dissertation by way of the previous chapters is necessary 













THE INTERNAL INCONSISTENCY ARGUMENT 
 
V.I. Introducing the Internal Inconsistency Argument 
The core of van den Haag’s axiom is retributivism’s view on punishment. 
This is the view that individuals deserve to be proportionally punished for the 
wrongs they have committed, which even some liberalists condone (Scheffler, 2000). 
The argument in this chapter attempts to demonstrate internal inconsistency when 
applying van den Haag’s axiom to capital sentencing on retributive grounds. This 
chapter is a modification of an argument presented by Laufer and Hsieh (2003). It is 
argued that an adherence to unequal justice infringes upon a retributivist core 
principle: that the wrongdoer’s punishment should be proportional to the 
wrongdoer’s desert (see Chapter II). 
 
V.II. Van den Haag’s ‘Parking Fine Analogy’ 
For the retributivist, it would be difficult to imagine a case when unequal 
justice is not always preferable to equal injustice. The person’s moral culpability 
determines the punishment he or she should receive. Even if other equally deserving 
individuals are not punished, this should not reduce the culpability of the wrongdoer 
or the punishment that he or she should receive. As the argument is that it is better 
that some wrongdoers receive punishment as opposed to none (i.e. abolitionism), 
retributivism claims unequal justice is always preferable. 
 In defence of this van den Haag provided an analogy which has fewer 
emotive and political ties to capital punishment and racial discrimination. Van den 
Haag (1985a) mentioned a scenario where parking fines are not affixed to high-cost 
vehicles (i.e. expensive vehicles) whose drivers are guilty of parking violations, but 
are affixed to low-cost vehicles (i.e. inexpensive vehicles) whose drivers are guilty 
of the same criminal offence. The terms ‘high-cost’ and ‘low-cost’ in no way reflects 
hierarchy between or distinctive values of different racial groups in this dissertation. 
Van den Haag asked two questions here and suggested a single negative 












drivers of high-cost vehicles did not receive parking fines render the drivers of low-
cost vehicles less guilty of their offences or less deserving of their parking fines? 
Secondly, and most importantly, would it be better to eliminate the punishment of 
parking fines for illegal acts of parking altogether? 
 
V.III. The ‘Burden of Relative Disadvantage’ Response 
Van den Haag was correct in stating that even though the drivers of high-cost 
vehicles were not punished for their offence the guilt of the low-cost vehicle drivers 
had not been diminished. However, van den Haag did not note that by punishing 
only the low-cost vehicle drivers he punished them more than they deserve (Laufer 
& Hsieh, 2003). This is because the high-cost vehicle drivers could use the money 
they would have to spend on the parking fines on other resources. So, the low-cost 
vehicle drivers suffer a greater inconvenience (i.e. the potential loss of resources or 
the inability to gain resources which could now be gained by the high-cost vehicle 
drivers) in addition to their fine. 
The disadvantage is relative: not in the general sense that high-cost vehicle 
owners would often have a disproportionate financial advantage to gain resources 
than would the low-cost vehicle owners. Rather, the disadvantage is relative because 
that disproportional access to resources between the low- and high-cost vehicle 
owners would increase. This inconvenience may be deemed ‘costs’ (van den Haag, 
1975), or the “burden of relative disadvantage” (or BORD) (Laufer & Hsieh, 2003, 
p. 348; for a general account of unfair advantage in punishment, see Gert, 1989; 
Murphy, 1990; Sher, 1987, 1997). 
In retributivism, van den Haag’s notion of injustice, as explained in Chapter 
IV, is associated with the wrongdoers not receiving the punishment they deserve 
either at all or less than they deserve. Equally so, punishing wrongdoers more than 
they deserve is considered injustice (Christopher, 2002). This is often an appealing 
justification for the application of retributivism over consequentialism for 
punishment (Scheffler, 1994). Even van den Haag stated that retributivists “would 
not like to see wrongdoers get away with impunity … [n]or would [retributivists] 
want people to suffer undeserved punishments, even if such injustice were somehow 












own analogy, by not fining the drivers of high-cost vehicles, the drivers of low-cost 
vehicles were punished more than they deserved. The low-cost vehicles suffer the 
parking fine and the BORD for their parking violation. Thus, it must be with 
hesitation that one could claim a preference for unequal justice over equal injustice, 
as unequal justice seems to breach the internal structure of retributivism. 
 
V.III.I. Expounding the ‘Burden of Relative Disadvantage’ 
Laufer and Hsieh (2003) expound the BORD in two ways. First, an approach 
of comparative punishment for desert is not adopted (see van den Haag’s second 
assumption in Chapter IV). In a comparative conception, the level of desert, and thus 
punishment, fluctuates in relation to whether others receive the same level of 
punishment when all are equally culpable (see Feinberg, 1970, 1973, 1974; 
Montague, 1980). In other words, the level of desert and punishment should decrease 
for low-cost vehicles’ drivers due to the high-cost vehicles’ drivers not receiving 
parking fines, because drivers of both types of vehicles committed the same offence. 
In this dissertation’s version of the argument, however, a traditional non-
comparative justice approach is adopted. This approach highlights the fact that it was 
the individuals’ culpability for the offence, and not their collective culpability, that 
indicated their level of desert and punishment. In other words, even though only low-
cost vehicles’ drivers were fined while high-cost vehicles’ drivers guilty of the same 
offence were not, the level of desert and thus punishment did not decrease for the 
low-cost vehicles’ drivers. This is the same idea of retribution as seen in Chapter II. 
The second point of clarification is the relationship between the BORD and 
the punishment. This dissertation does not assume that the BORD is always great in 
all circumstances of unequal justice. It does assume, however, that the BORD is 
positively correlated with the punishment (Laufer & Hsieh, 2003). So, in cases of 
unequal justice, if the punishment is not especially onerous, then the BORD is 
minor. In contrast, when the punishment is especially onerous, the BORD is 
significant. In this case, the wrongdoers who are punished are punished far more 














V.III.II. First Objection to the ‘Burden of Relative Disadvantage’ 
There are two objections van den Haagians may raise to the BORD. The first 
is that, because individuals are punished more than they deserve, a circumstance 
where there is a BORD is, in fact, not a circumstance of unequal justice (Laufer & 
Hsieh, 2003). Van den Haagian unequal justice reflects a circumstance where some 
wrongdoers are punished and other wrongdoers are not. Also, the punishment 
inflicted on the wrongdoers is not more than they deserve and innocent individuals 
are not punished. Hence, as the BORD forces individuals to receive more than their 
just deserts, circumstances in which a BORD exists are not, in theory, those in which 
unequal justice is present. 
In response to the first objection, one can even concede that unequal justice 
exists only in circumstances where there is a maldistribution of sentences, and no 
BORD. However, in order to avoid the first objection demonstrating fallacious 
circular logic, the BORD that is gained by the wrongdoer who was punished must be 
reduced to zero. As mentioned in the second clarification of the BORD, one must 
decrease the punishment incurred by the wrongdoer to decrease his or her BORD. 
However, once the punishment has been reduced enough to nullify the BORD, the 
wrongdoers now receive far less punishment than their individual moral desert 
indicates (Laufer & Hsieh, 2003). This violates one of van den Haag’s retributive 
principles. Thus, the first objection against the BORD response is unsuccessful. 
 
V.III.III. Second Objection to the ‘Burden of Relative Disadvantage’ 
The second objection is that the BORD does not violate retributivist 
principles by punishing the wrongdoer more than he or she deserves, as the act of 
punishing drivers of low-cost vehicles is distinct from the act of not punishing 
drivers of high-cost vehicles (Laufer & Hsieh, 2003). Thus, there is no BORD 
because the advantage the high-cost vehicle owners attain is completely separate 
from the disadvantage the low-cost vehicles receive. An illustration, and explanation, 
of two scenarios is necessary to highlight this. The scenarios are described by Laufer 
and Hsieh (2003) as follows: 
For the first scenario, the drivers of both low- and high-cost cost vehicles are 












additional parking fine tax charge that the high-cost vehicles do not receive. In the 
case of the second scenario, the drivers of low- and high-cost cost vehicles are both 
fined for their parking violations. However, the high-cost vehicles’ drivers all 
randomly win a prize in the town raffle worth the exact same amount as the parking 
fine, while all the low-cost vehicles’ drivers by chance win nothing. 
Thus in the first scenario the low-cost vehicles’ drivers evidently endure 
more punishment than they deserve. These drivers are overtly given greater fines 
than the high-cost vehicle drivers. However, in the second scenario, the drivers of 
low-cost vehicles do not receive more punishment than what was deserved. They 
receive the exact punishment they deserve. The disadvantage that the low-cost 
vehicles have is completely separate from the high-cost vehicles’ drivers winning the 
raffle thus cancelling out their parking fines (Laufer & Hsieh, 2003). 
Correspondingly, the BORD is not an overtly added punishment for the low-cost 
vehicles’ drivers, but merely a separate gain for the high-cost vehicles’ drivers. Thus, 
the BORD does not result in one group of wrongdoers being punished more than 
they deserve in cases of unequal justice. 
There is a difference between the first and second scenario that can be 
accepted. In the second scenario, however, there is also a difference between the 
disadvantage the low-cost vehicles’ drivers suffer and van den Haag’s analogy. The 
second scenario is described accurately. The advantage the high-cost vehicles’ 
drivers gained in winning a raffle to cancel out the parking fine is unrelated to the 
fact that low-cost vehicles’ drivers did not win the raffle and had to pay the full fine. 
The aspect of ‘raffle winning’ is independent from parking fines. However, in van 
den Haag’s analogy the advantage gained by the high-cost vehicle drivers by not 
having to pay a fine for the same violation committed by the low-cost vehicle 
drivers, who do have to pay fines, is directly connected and inseparable (Laufer & 
Hsieh, 2003). Thus, in cases where a BORD arises, the wrongdoers who are 
punished are in fact punished more than they deserve. 
 
V.IV. Concluding the Internal Inconsistency Argument 
This argument has been used to demonstrate that van den Haag’s general 












problematic due to the BORD. As stated in the second clarification of the BORD, the 
more severe the punishment in an unequal distribution of punishment the more 
severe is the BORD. Also, van den Haag and Conrad (1983) stated that “death must 
be the greatest of punishments” (p. 225) due to its finality (see Capital Punishment, 
1972). Thus the BORD for those wrongdoers selected to receive capital punishment 
for arbitrary reasons, such as racial bias, should be astronomically high. These 
wrongdoers are punished far more than they deserve, enough even to warrant a 
complaint of equal injustice. 
However, it is solely the death penalty that makes unusual use of the BORD. 
If only one murderer is executed while many other equally guilty offenders are not, 
there can be no added ‘cost’ or disadvantage to their punishment, simply because 
that offender has been executed (Laufer & Hsieh, 2003). (First-degree) murderers, 
then, receive their just deserts, no more and no less, even when the distribution is 
arbitrary or unequal. Therefore, although van den Haag seems incorrect in a general 
sense, the death penalty is unique enough to be the exception where unequal justice 
is preferable to equal injustice. 
Nonetheless, the BORD response is useful in two ways. First, on retributivist 
grounds, one need not always favour unequal justice over equal injustice as van den 
Haag claims in respect of every punishment. Secondly, van den Haag’s ‘parking fine 
analogy’, highlights unequal justice by excluding the broader socio-historical context 
of inequality, prejudice and racism, and its effects on capital sentencing and the 
legitimacy of judicial authorities. The second argument against van den Haag, as 
presented in the next chapter, includes racial bias within capital sentencing and the 
effect it has on the public’s perception of the legitimacy of the judicial authority 














THE IMPLICIT ILLEGITIMATE AUTHORITY ARGUMENT 
 
VI.I. Introducing the Implicit Illegitimate Authority Argument 
The argument presented in this chapter takes a broader look at capital 
punishment on retributive grounds, the approach being from a commonly ignored 
area – whether the criminal justice system or authority imposing the punishment is 
legitimate. This chapter uses to some degree another argument proposed by Laufer 
and Hsieh (2003). Here the strength of van den Haag’s axiom is investigated when 
perceptions of illegitimacy of the authority are rife due to systematic racial 
inequalities in capital sentencing. 
 
VI.II. Public Perception, Legitimacy and Authority 
The inference of this argument is that retributivism necessitates that the state 
be a legitimate authority in distributing punishment to wrongdoers (Laufer & Hsieh, 
2003; Walker, 1991). The implication is drawn from the responsibility of the state to 
act as a surrogate to govern according to the people’s will and to oversee a just 
distribution of punishment (Pollack, 1992). For van den Haag, and Kant, the state 
deals with civilians as ends in themselves by inflicting punishment on wrongdoers 
(Kant, 1797/1996; Walker, 1991; see also Sarat, 2002, for a discussion on the death 
penalty demonstrating sovereignty). Here, retributivism is “indispensable to the 
maintenance of any social order” (van den Haag, 1975, p. 12). 
Predictably, negative encounters with the judicial process involved in capital 
sentencing have a tendency to produce highly negative assessments of a state’s 
legitimacy (Laufer & Hsieh, 2003). The continued existence of a public institution or 
authority rests upon this perception of the state’s legitimacy, as corroboration 
between the state and civilians is vital to establish and maintain legislative and social 
order (Jost & Major, 2001a; Lind & Tyler, 1988). For civilians, the desire to put faith 
in, abide by, and co-operate with legislative bodies, rests largely in their view of the 












According to Laufer and Hsieh (2003), a massive quantity of social 
psychology research demonstrates that there are two interconnected aspects that 
determine the public’s perception of a legitimate authority (Tyler, 1990, 1997, 
2001a; Tyler & Huo, 2002). First, the public must perceive the criminal justice 
system to implement fair procedures and sanctions. Secondly, the public must 
perceive the motivation for those procedures and sanctions to be impartial. Thus, the 
public’s perception of legitimacy is based on a procedural and motivational 
impartiality from the authorities within the criminal justice system (see Folger, 
1984). 
The emphasis placed on impartial treatment is due to the public’s 
understanding that all citizens have equal value in the society (Tyler, 2001b). 
Additionally, reviewers and commentators look for logical, impartial and constant 
decision-making when it comes to administering capital sentences (see Greenberg, 
1982). Hence, the authorities that deliver capital sentences have the burden not only 
of giving a fair or proportional sentence to wrongdoers but of ensuring – and 
demonstrating – that the motivation or purpose behind the sentence appears unbiased 
to the public (Laufer & Hsieh, 2003). The latter is no small feat considering the past 
plethora of racial disparities and ideologies of superiority with eugenic and 
biological positivistic undertones (see Lombroso-Ferrero, 1972), and the suppression 
of civil and social equality in both the United States and South Africa (Fredrickson, 
1981; also see Ogletree, 2002; Turrell, 2004). 
Thus, the more unequal treatment administered in the course of criminal 
justice is, the greater the perception of illegitimacy of the authority (and the greater 
the need to justify the marginalisation and suffering of those discriminated against) 
(Olson & Hafer, 2001). So, when this authority delivers punishments where 
maldistribution of sentences is attributed to the acceptance of racial discrimination, 
the legitimacy of the authority begins to depreciate, as does the social order (Laufer 
& Hsieh, 2003). 
 
VI.III. Public Perception and Racial Maldistribution 
This dissertation does not dispute that there is often racial maldistribution in 












discrimination in capital sentencing in the United States, especially when the victim 
is white (see Baldus, 1998; Sorenson, Wallace, & Pilgrim, 2001). In the U.S. there 
have been duplicate outcomes in a range of jurisdictions such as Florida, North 
Carolina, Texas, South Carolina, and Georgia (see Baldus et al., 1983; Baldus, 
Woodworth, & Pulaski, 1990; Baldus, Woodworth, Zuckerman, Weiner, & Broffitt, 
1998; Gross, 1985; Paternoster, 1983; Radelet & Vandiver, 1983; United States 
General Accounting Office [GAO], 1990; Zeisel, 1981). In South Africa, similar 
uses of the death penalty were noted (see Goldfarb, 1990; Turrell, 2004; van 
Niekerk, 1979). 
Racial maldistribution in capital sentencing can be seen in several 
discriminatory modes in the U.S. Bienen (1996) has noted racial discrimination in 
the forms of stereotypical views of race by the jurors, the prosecutor, the judges, and 
in the aspirations of the political leaders who assign cases to these judicial authorities 
(see also Bright, 1994). Even in pre-abolitionist South Africa, Turrell (2004) and van 
Niekerk (1979) noted some similar modes of discrimination, such as racial 
stereotypes used by judges and prosecutors. The extent of racial disparity is not 
readily dismissible as negligent, particularly within the United States. For instance, 
one study reported that “[m]ore than two out of every three capital judgments 
reviewed by the courts during a 23-year period were found to be seriously flawed 
[with racial disparities]” (Liebman et al., 2000, p. 1). 
Evidence of racial disparities resulting in a diminished faith in the criminal 
justice process is seen in the United States, and has been seen in South Africa, in the 
form of opinion polls, naturalistic observations, experimental studies, anecdotal 
evidence and / or surveys (see Barkan & Cohn, 1994; Bohm, 1990, 1991; Bohm, 
Clark, & Aveni, 1990, 1991; Bohm & Jamieson, 1995; Bohm & Vogel, 1991, 1994; 
Bohm, Vogel, & Maisto, 1993; Goldfarb, 1990; Hamilton et al., 2001; Sandys, 1995; 
Turrell, 2000, 2004; Tyler & Huo, 2002; van Niekerk, 1979; Wright, Lambert, & 
Clarke, 2001; Zimring, 2003). 
In the U.S., where several states retain the death penalty, “minority group[s, 
such as black individuals, in contrast to being the majority racial group in South 
Africa,] … feel that they are treated with bias and injustice” (Tyler & Huo, 2002, p. 












Gallup & Newport, 1991; GAO, 1990). Kennedy (1988) notes that black individuals 
are “slighted by criminal justice systems that respond more forcefully to the killing 
of whites than the killing of blacks” (p. 1394; see also Baldus, Pulaski, & 
Woodworth, 1992). As such, “the perception of unequal treatment is the single most 
important source of popular dissatisfaction with the … legal system” (Sarat, 1977, p. 
434). 
 
VI.IV. Public Perception and Unequal Justice 
This argument posits that faith in the judiciary and the perception of its 
legitimacy are tied to van den Haag’s conception of unequal justice (Bilionis, 1993). 
Some theorists have noted that justice does not necessarily imply equality (Nozick, 
1974). Others have gone as far as to state that equality is “an empty vessel with no 
substantive moral content of its own” (Westen, 1982, p. 547). Similarly, van den 
Haag questioned why the judiciary discerned equality as having a primary role over 
justice. 
Van den Haag would suggest that even if “[e]veryone is equal before the 
law” (South African Constitution, 1996, p. 7, s. 9(1)) the underlying and more 
prominent message is “… justice for all” (“Pledge of Allegiance”, 2009) – for justice 
to be equally distributed. For van den Haag, “[j]ustice requires punishing the guilty – 
as many of the guilty as possible, even if actually only some can be punished” (van 
den Haag & Conrad, 1983, p. 224). 
Although van den Haag stated that unequal justice can be repellent on moral 
grounds and “detrimental to the social fabric” (van den Haag & Conrad, 1983, p. 
225) his explanation was different from this argument. Unequal justice is morally 
repellent not because some wrongdoers are chosen for their just deserts based on 
their race, but rather, because not all wrongdoers are chosen in spite of it (Laufer & 
Hsieh, 2003). Moreover, the social fabric is weakened because only some capital 
offenders receive the death penalty due to maldistribution, not that maldistribution 
due to racial discrimination corrodes the trust in and commitment to the authority of 












Many scholars have debated the issue of fairness and equality (see Bassett, 
2002). However, the present argument contends that van den Haag ignored the 
public’s perception that the authorities that seem to dismiss racial bias in capital 
sentencing are illegitimate (Laufer & Hsieh, 2003). This cultivates the idea that 
inequalities within sentencing are tolerable, reasonable, and even just (Jost & Major, 
2001b). Similarly, van den Haag did not recognise any amount of racial inequality to 
affect justice (see Chapter IV). So, by endorsing unequal justice in spite of palpable 
and verified proof of racial discrimination in capital sentencing, he played a role in 
defending, justifying and validating inequalities in sentencing. 
This is an awkward position for the retributivist as retributive theory is meant 
to surpass racial inequalities to ensure those deserving receive their punishment. To 
explicate, racial maldistribution in capital sentencing had unseemly outcomes for van 
den Haag in different hypothetical cases. For instance, if the lives of black murderers 
were valued equivalently to those of white murderers in capital sentencing (with all 
else constant), there might be fewer murderers receiving their just deserts (Laufer & 
Hsieh, 2003). Furthermore, if the lives of white murderers were valued equivalently 
to black murderers in capital sentencing (with all else constant), there may be 
numerous murderers receiving their just deserts (Laufer & Hsieh, 2003). Therefore, 
the real impact on justice of racism in capital sentencing seems ignored or acceptable 
for retributivists even when its effects on retributive principles are considered. 
 
VI.V. Public Perception and Equal Injustice 
The argument has so far focused on unequal justice and the perception of 
legitimacy. However, the van den Haagian equal injustice will also be added. Van 
den Haag described equal injustice as the abolition of the death penalty and an 
illogical substitute for unequal justice (see Chapter IV). Nonetheless, equal injustice 
would most likely be observed in a different manner by racial groups whose past is 
flooded with false arrests, politically motivated prosecutions and capital sanctions – 
whether one speaks of apartheid in South Africa, or the Southern United States’ 
extrajudicial lynching, peaking between the end of the nineteenth century and the 












Pure retributivists may not consider the significance of abolishing capital 
punishment for individual members of previously subjugated and exploited groups 
(Goldberg, 2002). Although van den Haag’s idea of justice as being as equal as 
possible had merit, he ignored the fact that the amount of racial inequality and the 
public’s perception of the authorities’ illegitimacy reached beyond his conception 
(Entman & Rojecki, 2000; Kluegel & Smith, 1986; Mills, 1998). What is required of 
van den Haag’s followers is to admit that racial discrimination corrodes the 
perceived legitimacy of the criminal justice system, which challenges the legitimacy 
of that institution and capital punishment. Racial discrimination in van den Haag’s 
assertion for unequal justice then cannot always be considered morally irrelevant. 
 
VI.VI. Concluding the Implicit Illegitimate Authority Argument 
It may be so that “no human system of punishment can avoid the possibility 
of punishing the innocent and punishing the guilty more than they deserve” 
(Alexander, 2002, p. 819). Even van den Haag admitted that flaws in the criminal 
process ended up punishing an “unavoidably capricious … [and] … random, 
selection of the guilty” (van den Haag & Conrad, 1983, p. 224). However, the 
evidence for racial disparity is concise and far less vague. As there is much empirical 
evidence demonstrating racial discrimination in the criminal justice system, there is 
an inference as to which races deserve capital punishment from a retributive 
viewpoint (Laufer & Hsieh, 2003). 
This is problematic for van den Haag who deemed race to be unimportant 
and ineffectual in determining desert and allocating punishment. Although pure 
retributivists claim that the “judicial system … deserves and gains the trust of the 
community by effectively protecting its order and satisfying its sense of justice” (van 
den Haag, 1975, p. 13), neither the social order nor the feeling of judicial repute are 
present for these disparate groups. The view of those retributivists who say that “[i]t 
is important for laws and courts not only to be just but also appear just” (van den 
Haag & Conrad, 1983, p. 230) needs to be questioned. 
It could well be argued that although this proposition has merit it is 
structurally weak. First, inferring that retributivism accepts racism is not a sound 












controversial nature of van den Haag’s position, his notion of individual moral 
desert, and the initial motivation for challenging his axiom in this dissertation. 
Secondly, it is understandable that racial maldistribution in capital sentencing has a 
high likelihood of instilling a negative perception of the authority involved. There is, 
however, only a tentative connection between the public’s perception of the 
authority’s illegitimacy and its actual illegitimacy, and thus, the legitimacy of the 
punishment for capital crimes. Also, although public perception may indicate 
whether there will be social order, there is no causal link to suggest that if this social 
order cannot be maintained, that it is only because the authority and capital 
punishment sentences are illegitimate. The most appropriate counter to van den 
Haag’s axiom is to explicitly determine the authority as illegitimate. The third 
argument against van den Haag, in the next chapter, attempts this, but first 
establishes a stronger philosophical association between a legitimate authority and 













THE EXPLICIT ILLEGITIMATE AUTHORITY ARGUMENT 
 
VII.I. Introducing the Explicit Illegitimate Authority Argument 
Van den Haag does not seem to acknowledge the ‘right’ involved in fulfilling 
moral desert claims or punishing the wrongdoer (van den Haag, 1986). There is an 
association between those who deserve punishment and those with the right or 
legitimate authority to punish (for a philosophical debate on legitimate authority, see 
Bates, 1972; Edmundson, 1998; Krehoff, 2008; Ladenson, 1972a, 1972b; Nowell-
Smith, 1976; Westphal, 1992). This chapter, based on an argument presented by 
McDermott (2001), philosophically extrapolates this association, in order to 
determine whether or not the authority is legitimate and thus whether or not the 
punishment that authority decrees is legitimate. If any punishment is provided by an 
illegitimate authority, that punishment is reduced to harm, thereby promoting further 
injustice. Here harm is equated with a punishment that has no moral or retributive 
justification – punishment that is illegitimate. 
 
VII.II. Nathanson’s ‘Bearded Speeder Analogy’ 
Stephen Nathanson (1985) argues that the key mistake in van den Haag’s 
reasoning concerning racial maldistribution in capital sentencing for wrongdoers is 
the underlying motivation for the punishment. Nathanson (1985) expressed a simpler 
analogy to van den Haag (seen in Chapter V) to demonstrate this: A traffic officer on 
a highway is meant to fine all speeders. However, the traffic officer only fines those 
speeders who have beards. In this unequal distribution of sentences, are the bearded 
individuals treated unjustly even though they are speeders? 
Nathanson (1985) would suggest that the bearded speeders were treated 
unjustly because the purpose of the punishment was not clearly related to the 
offence. The presence of a beard was the primary motivation for fining, and speeding 
a secondary motive (Nathanson, 1985). Thus, even though the bearded speeders 
deserved the punishment they received, the distribution of that punishment was 












While Nathanson’s analogy has merit, it is unable, however, to argue 
effectively against van den Haag’s position. Van den Haag would simply assert 
individual just desert (McDermott, 2001). As the bearded speeders broke the law 
they deserve to be punished accordingly, even if the traffic officer was biased and 
this reflected poorly on the traffic department (van den Haag, 1985b). For van den 
Haag, the only injustice is that the non-bearded speeders did not receive speeding 
fines. The arbitrary decision of the traffic officer does not alter the wrongness of the 
bearded speeders’ actions or their deserved punishment. 
 
VII.III. Just Desert and Legitimate Authority 
It is not, then, the motivation that seems to underlie the association between 
the legitimacy of the authority and the legitimacy of the punishment as Nathanson 
suggests, but rather, according to Jeffrie Murphy (1969), three provisos must be met 
to deem the punishment as legitimate and not mere harm. There must be “a system of 
rules, authorities to apply these rules, and authorities to enforce sanctions for 
breaches of these rules” (p. 261; see also Benn & Peters, 1959; Flew, 1954; Hart, 
1968b). In Nathanson’s analogy, there is a criminal justice system with rules or laws 
pertaining to speeding and the traffic officer is a state designated authority to apply 
these speeding laws. Thus provisos one and two are met. However, it can be argued 
that the third proviso was not met as the traffic officer who traditionally has the 
authority to fine individuals who speed lost that authority on account of his prejudice 
against bearded speeders (McDermott, 2001). If this is so, the fines given were harm, 
not punishment, and thus in violation of van den Haagian retributive justice. 
 
VII.III.I. Do All Desert Claims Need a Legitimate Authority? 
A strong philosophical association between the legitimacy of the authority 
and the legitimacy of the punishment in order to fulfil moral desert claims it is vital 
for this argument. As such, this dissertation will return to the above argument at a 
later stage once this issue has been dealt with. The desert claim used by McDermott 
(2001) and in this dissertation is: ‘X deserves punishment P’. It is argued that only a 
legitimate authority must inflict punishment P on X. Hence, retributivists should not, 












situations where the authority has the right to punish. However, one must question 
whether desert claims even need a legitimate authority to execute them. 
There are desert claims that do not require an exceptional source or authority 
to execute them. Examples of these, for instance, are desert claims such as: ‘Steve 
Biko deserves acclaim for his involvement in the struggle against apartheid’, and, 
‘the Nelson Mandela statue in Nelson Mandela Square deserves respect’. These, 
however, are not desert claims of justice. It is not credible to state that it would be 
morally unjust if these acts were not to occur (McDermott, 2001). A situation 
dissimilar to this occurs – and is considered unjust on the grounds of retributive 
theory – when X does not receive punishment P, which he or she deserves. Thus, the 
previously mentioned desert claims are for purposes other than justice. 
 
VII.III.II. Do All Desert Claims of Justice Need a Legitimate Authority? 
There are, however, also desert claims of justice which do not necessitate a 
specific authority. For instance, the desert claim that ‘everyone deserves to be 
respected’ is a claim of justice. The reason for this is that it is credible to state (even 
though the assertion is a weak one) that respect is deserved from a particular source 
or authority (i.e. everyone else) and thus the absence of this conduct (or disrespect 
for others) is morally unjust (McDermott, 2001). 
In a stronger sense, Section 10 of The Bill of Rights, which is contained in 
the South African Constitution, states: “Everyone [deserves or] has … the right to 
have their dignity respected” (1996, p. 7, s.10), and in Section 8(1), “The Bill of 
Rights applies to all law, and binds the legislature, the executive, the judiciary and 
all organs of state” (1996, p. 6, s. 8). Here, it is highly credible to offer this as a 
claim of justice, as the source or authority to fulfil this desert claim is clearly 
specified, and thus the absence of this conduct is both morally and legally unjust. 
However, in respect of the claim that ‘everyone deserves to be respected’ the 
authority involved in fulfilling it is everyone, in effect, there ceases to be a specific 
authority to deliver that respect (McDermott, 2001). The second case has the same 
result. Although Section 8(1) of the South African Constitution (1996) states the 
specific authority that must provide the respect (i.e. not everyone in the society is a 












everyone in the society can also fulfil the desert claim). Thus, in both the weaker and 
stronger sense, there are desert claims of justice which do not necessitate a specific 
authority, with only that authority having the ‘right’ to fulfil desert claims. 
 
VII.III.III. The Uniqueness of a Desert Claim of Just Punishment 
Desert claims of just punishment are distinct from the desert claims 
mentioned above due to the kind of deserved conduct (McDermott, 2001). For 
instance, acclaim, respect and dignity, can be provided at any time by any person or 
institution with virtually no fluctuation in meaning, regardless of the circumstances 
of the delivery. However, punishment can only be a punishment (or a penalty) and 
not an affliction of pure harm in particular circumstances. 
As an example, to end the life of another can be punishment, as in the death 
penalty, or harm, as when an individual murders a man to obtain his vehicle. To 
distinguish between the two meanings one views the ‘right’ given to the person(s) or 
institution(s) committing the act in the different circumstances (McDermott, 2001). 
The person or institution must have the specific ‘right’ to punish in particular 
circumstances in order to be a specific legitimate authority, so that the affliction is 
distinguishably punishment (and just) as opposed to harm (and unjust). 
Therefore, the desert claim ‘X deserves punishment P’ has an internal clause, 
the term ‘punishment’ (McDermott, 2001). This claim necessitates a specific 
legitimate authority so that the desert claim ‘X deserves harm H’ is not fulfilled, and 
for the desert claim of just punishment to be executed. In denying this, morally just 
punishments would amount to any person(s) or institution(s) injuring another in 
retaliation for any harm suffered in any circumstance. 
 
VII.III.IV. A Lockean Interjection 
Is it tantamount to insanity to suggest that any person or institution has the 
right to punish in any circumstance? According to McDermott (2001), one may 
revisit John Locke in order to answer that. Locke was a pioneer in contemporary 
political philosophy, particularly social contract theory (as discussed in Chapter II). 












1922) and in the writings of philosophers, such as Rousseau (1712-1778), Hume 
(1711-1776), and Kant (1724-1804). 
Locke argued that in the ‘state of nature’, the original state of being, every 
individual possesses a natural and equal ‘right’ to inflict punishment (Locke, 
1690/1988). Thus, the desert claim ‘X deserves punishment P’ could be morally and 
justly executed by anyone in any circumstance. However, once those in the ‘state of 
nature’ cross over the threshold into civil society the individual ‘right’ to punish is 
ceded to an authority (Locke, 1690/1988). The authority, given the ‘right’ or 
legitimacy to punish in particular circumstances, was agreed upon and designed for 
the benefit of all while under the ‘veil of ignorance’ (Kymlicka, 2002). Hence, the 
desert claim that ‘X deserves punishment P’ could not be executed by anyone, for 
only the legitimate authority in particular circumstances may inflict pain on another 
for it to be a just punishment, and not merely unjust harm. 
 
VII.IV. Illegitimate Authority: A Return to Nathanson 
Thus far, it is clear that for a punishment to be just on retributive grounds the 
authority must be legitimate. If the authority is not legitimate, the moral desert claim 
is not executed as the penalty inflicted on the wrongdoer counts as mere harm. Van 
den Haag is correct that the maldistribution of punishment does not impinge on 
individual desert (Chapter IV). However, the legitimacy of the authority does indeed. 
As stated before in the context of Murphy’s (1969) three provisos, the traffic officer 
is generally considered a legitimate authority. However, in Nathanson’s analogy, the 
officer superseded his own authority, thereby becoming an illegitimate authority, and 
thus his subsequent punishment illegitimate and unjust (McDermott, 2001). 
To explain, this traffic officer happened to choose individuals with beards for 
special treatment. He could have chosen the infirm, the elderly, or individuals who 
are white, coloured, black, and so on. The point is the same. The traffic officer’s 
personal bias altered his behaviour and overwhelmingly dishonoured his directive of 
impartiality to administer fines. With this behaviour in that particular circumstance 
he exceeded his mandate and negated the reason for his having that position of 
authority. Without a doubt the bearded speeders do deserve punishment but not by 












levied fell into the category of unjust harm. As a result the wrongdoer does not have 
his or her desert claims fulfilled or receive the punishment he or she deserves – and 
in addition endures unjustified harm from the illegitimate authority (McDermott, 
2001). This demonstrates that in the case of an arbitrary distribution of punishment, 
unequal justice, as opposed to the alternative in van den Haag’s axiom, promotes 
more retributive injustice. 
 
VII.IV.I. The Illegitimacy of the Capital Sentencing Authority 
The outcome of Nathanson’s analogy will be applied to racial maldistribution 
in capital sentencing. According to the desert claim of just punishment, a judicial 
authority, such as a judge or a set of jurors, can inflict just punishment only when 
that judicial authority has the ‘right’ to punish in particular circumstances – or is 
acting legitimately. However, instead of compiling a list of legitimate actions, one 
could generate a list of illegitimate ones (McDermott, 2001). Illegitimate acts are 
considered actions that are in direct violation to that authority’s mandate. From a 
democratic viewpoint, chosen as it aligns with Kant’s (1797/1996) conception of an 
ideal state and legitimate authority to dispense punishment, the authority’s mandate 
may be include in the Constitution of the authority’s jurisdiction – as liberalist 
principles are currently commonly included in state legislation (McDermott, 2001). 
For example, Section 9(3) of the South African Constitution (1996), notes 
that “[t]he state may not unfairly discriminate directly or indirectly against anyone 
on one or more grounds, including race, gender, sex, pregnancy, marital status, 
ethnic or social origin, colour[, and so on]” (p.7). So, if the juridical authority 
exercised racial bias in capital decisions – which counters constitutional and liberal 
egalitarian principles – the legitimacy of the authority is exceeded, making the 
authority and thus the authority’s sentence illegitimate. However, as the judicial 
authority is a representative of the state, does the state become illegitimate if its 
representative is deemed illegitimate? 
 
VII.IV.II. The Boundaries of Illegitimacy 
The conceptual connection between legitimate authorities and the execution 












consideration of the parameter for illegitimacy is problematic. In other words, to 
what extent do illegitimate acts affect an otherwise legitimate institution? One can 
take a Gestalt-like view in which any illegitimate authority, exercising a then 
illegitimate sanction, could result in the whole criminal justice system or state 
government becoming illegitimate. For instance, if the ‘Baldus study’ is correct in 
demonstrating racial bias and maldistribution in death penalty sentencing, this means 
the criminal justice system in the State of Georgia, or even the whole U.S. 
government could be illegitimate. 
However, if one illegitimate practice or part thereof made the whole criminal 
justice system or government illegitimate there may be no governments at all that 
can be considered morally legitimate to distribute just punishments (McDermott, 
2001). So, if a particular practice were illegitimate, such as capital sentencing due to 
racial bias – and the illegitimacy could not be removed – the practice itself should 
then be removed (i.e. equal injustice). This is echoed by abolitionist Charles Black 
(1974) who maintains that racial bias, as part of judicial discretion, would never 
escape the process of capital sentencing. Hence, if the authority is illegitimate due to 
racial discrimination in capital sentencing, the punishment of state sanctioned 
execution can never be morally just, and so should be abolished. 
 
VII.IV.III. Legitimacy by Removing Judicial Discretion 
A retributivist may desire to remove judicial discretion from capital 
sentencing, eliminating bias, making the authority legitimate and the punishment 
just, in that they fulfil the wrongdoer’s moral desert claim (McDermott, 2001). It is, 
however, unlikely for any court to find this acceptable. For instance, after Furman 
(Chapter III), the U.S. Supreme Court in Woodson v. North Carolina (1976) ruled 
against this motion (see also Roberts v. Louisiana, 1976). Justice Stewart said that 
the Eighth Amendment “requires consideration of the character and record of the 
individual offender and the circumstances of the particular offence as a 
constitutionally indispensable part of the process of inflicting the penalty of death” 
(Woodson v. North Carolina, 1976, p. 304). 
Theoretically, a retributivist should consider the circumstances surrounding 












a more accurate and, therefore, just punishment (McDermott, 2001). As Jeffrie 
Murphy stated: 
To avoid inflicting upon persons more suffering than they deserve, or 
to avoid punishing the less responsible, is a simple – indeed obvious – 
demand of justice. Basic demands of justice are that like cases [are] 
treated alike, that morally relevant differences between persons be 
noticed, and that our treatment of those persons be affected by those 
differences. This demand for individuation – a tailoring of our 
retributive response to the individual natures of the persons with 
whom we are dealing – is a part of what we mean by taking persons 
seriously as persons [as ends in themselves] and thus is a basic 
demand of justice. (Murphy & Hampton, 1988, p. 171) 
 
VII.IV.IV. Unintentional Racial Discrimination 
Claimed thus far, when racial maldistribution occurs in capital sentencing the 
authority becomes illegitimate, as does the practice. So, the death penalty should be 
abolished (i.e. equal injustice) when there is an arbitrary or racial maldistribution, 
particularly because there is no significant retributive reason to remove judicial 
discretion. There is, however, a distinction between intentional and unintentional 
racial discrimination (McDermott, 2001). In Nathanson’s ‘bearded speeder analogy’, 
the action to fine bearded speeders only was intentional, which exceeded the 
boundaries of his or her authority. This intention is inevitably what made the 
punishment illegitimate. 
What of unintentional racial discrimination? For instance, in the McCleskey 
case (Chapter III), Justice Powell mentioned that although the ‘Baldus study’ 
demonstrated general racial discrimination in capital sentencing in the Georgia 
criminal justice system, the study did not indicate that McCleskey was intentionally 
targeted. As a result, the Court rejected his appeal against his capital sentence. 
Nonetheless, if certain judicial practices are discriminatory against a group of 
individuals, whether it is race-based, gender-based, and the like, and not necessarily 
targeting a specific individual, then that authority is illegitimate and the punishment 
unjust (McDermott, 2001). Similar reasoning was seen in Furman (Chapter III), 
where systematic abuses of death penalty jurisprudence, and not necessarily targeted 
malice, rendered the death penalty in Georgia ‘cruel and unusual’ (1972, p. 309; see 












It is philosophically nonsensical to claim that when an authority is biased 
toward some members of the society and not toward others, that it is illegitimate at 
times and legitimate at other times (McDermott, 2001). One has only to use the 
apartheid government as an example of this. Was it illegitimate when overseeing 
non-white individuals and legitimate when overseeing white individuals? One of the 
main goals of a liberal government is “the achievement of equality”, particularly that 
of “[n]on-racialism” (South African Constitution, 1996, p. 3). Therefore, if the 
authority generally practices illegitimate acts within a kind of criminal sentencing, 
such as racial discrimination in capital sentencing, the authority is in toto 
illegitimate. The authority does not rotate between legitimacy and illegitimacy 
depending on the individuals being sentenced at the time. Thus, even when there are 
occasions when the authority does not appear to be discriminatory and there is 
general racial bias in the capital sentencing system, the authority remains illegitimate 
and the capital punishment becomes unjust. 
 
VII.V. Concluding the Explicit Illegitimate Authority Argument 
If the death penalty is not eliminated (i.e. equal injustice) the retributivist 
should be wary of a problem in addition to the wrongdoers not receiving their just 
deserts. In applying racial discrimination in capital sentencing, the judicial authority 
has violated its mandate, transforming the punishment into unjust harm because the 
authority has become illegitimate. This not only counter-acts the aim of retribution, 
but doubles the injustice. The desert claim of just punishment as applied to the 
wrongdoer is not fulfilled and an additional act of unjust harm is made against the 
offender. This violates two aspects of van den Haag’s retributivism. The offender 
does not receive the punishment he or she deserves, and the offender is harmed 
without any moral justification. Van den Haag rejects abolitionism or life 
imprisonment on the grounds that the punishment the wrongdoers receive is less than 
they deserve (van den Haag, 1986). However, if the aim of van den Haag’s 
retributivism is to produce as much justice as possible by accurately meeting desert 
with punishment, he should, in cases with racially maldistributed capital sentences, 













THE DISGUISED EQUAL DISTRIBUTION RESPONSE 
 
VIII.I. Introducing the Disguised Equal Distribution Response 
The argument put forward in Chapter VII is that on pure retributivist grounds 
a punishment is just only when the authority administering the punishment is 
legitimate. However, racial discrimination within capital sentencing makes the 
authority illegitimate, as the authority oversteps its mandate of impartiality. So, the 
death penalty becomes an illegitimate practice, exerting only harm and not just 
punishment, regardless of the wrongdoer’s guilt. This creates further injustice, 
inhibiting the goal of retributivism, whereby the illegitimate practice should be 
abolished. However, this chapter, partly based on an argument presented by Brooks 
(2004), suggests that the above argument is not a valid argument against the morality 
of the death penalty per se, merely the illusion of one. The explicit illegitimate 
authority argument is, in fact, an argument against the innate immorality of 
maldistribution – or rather, highlights the inherent morality of equalising 
distribution. This is explained in the subsequent sections of this chapter. 
 
VIII.II. Disguised Equal Distribution with Capital Maldistribution 
Nathanson’s analogy as outlined in Chapter VII is worthy of re-examination. 
Brooks (2004) notes a scenario where the traffic officer in Nathanson’s analogy was 
replaced by Traffic Officer B. Traffic Officer B fines all speeders, although a group 
of drivers who are regular offenders (such as sports car drivers) nonetheless emerge. 
On retributive grounds, all those deserving of punishment should have received it, 
regardless of whether a specific group of wrongdoers emerged afterward. Therefore 
the elimination of the imposition of speeding fines altogether would be unnecessary 
if the distribution were simply improved. 
Correspondingly, this means that if there were no racial maldistribution in 
capital sentencing there would be no reason to denote the practice as illegitimate and 
eliminate it (Brooks, 2004). For example, if during apartheid black and white 












the death penalty, and the argument in Chapter VII would be revealed as an 
argument for the improved distribution of capital sentencing. As mentioned in 
Chapter V, van den Haag argued that no change in the distribution of a sentence 
could make an innately immoral sentence an innately moral one, and vice versa. As 
seen in Gregg v. Georgia (1976), as opposed to State v. Makwanyane (1995) 
(Chapter III), if capital punishment distribution is rectified by removing bias, there is 
no reason to abolish the death penalty. 
 
VIII.III. Disguised Equal Distribution with Mass Sanction Maldistribution 
The argument presented in Chapter VII assumed that capital punishment is 
the only judicial punishment that is illegitimate due to racial bias. It is difficult, 
however, to imagine why, if racial discrimination exists in capital sentencing, it 
would not exist in other penal sanctions as well (Brooks, 2004). This chapter does 
not argue that one illegitimate practice infects the whole, but rather, if all (or most) 
punishments in the criminal justice system (including capital punishment) are 
maldistributed due to racism – following the previous chapter’s logic – all or most 
penalties imposed by the criminal justice system should be eliminated because the 
authority imposing them is illegitimate. 
Brooks (2004) suggests that there are two plausible responses that 
abolitionists may use. First, those purporting equal injustice may agree and 
recommend the dismantling of the entire criminal justice system, or even the state or 
country’s entire government. Secondly, others may be reluctant to dismantle the 
entire criminal justice system, but still recognise the singularity of the death penalty, 
and so desire to eliminate only that practice. Both perspectives will be discussed, 
beginning with the former view. 
 
VIII.III.I. Abolish the Entire Maldistributed System 
For those abolitionists who accept that in the event of all or most penalties 
being maldistributed the entire criminal justice system should be abolished, the equal 
distribution response still stands (Brooks, 2004). Some abolitionists suggest that “[i]f 
it is the case that the entire system is corrupted by racial discrimination, then it is an 












(McDermott, 2001, p. 330). Although in most countries this would be complicated 
and laborious, it is a path that has been taken by some countries, South Africa being 
one such example. Following the demise of apartheid, the government, the 
Constitution and the criminal justice system changed dramatically to the country’s 
great benefit, particularly with regards to advocating non-racism. 
However, although in South Africa the criminal justice system was reformed, 
a new government elected, and a Constitution acknowledged as “the most admirable 
constitution in the history of the world” (Sunstein, 2001, p. 261) introduced, 
abolishing the entire maldistributed system was not done. The system was merely 
revamped to reduce elements of racial bias. Certain laws that were blatantly racist 
such as the Pass Laws Act (1952) and the Bantu Education Act (1953) were 
abrogated, while many other laws meant to be equally applicable to all citizens, 
which may still be maldistributed, were not. If it is the maldistribution of the 
punishment that is the problem then it is the distribution itself that needs to be 
reformed, revamped, or improved.  
 
VIII.III.II. Abolish Only the Death Penalty in the Maldistributed System 
There are abolitionists who would not advocate the dismantling of the entire 
criminal justice system, but still consider the death penalty the only practice worthy 
of elimination in a sea of penal sanction maldistribution. Nathanson (1985) 
commented that: 
To do away with punishment entirely would be to do away with the 
criminal law and the system of constraints which it supports … if we 
abolish capital punishment, there is reason to believe that nothing 
[dangerous] will happen. (p. 162) 
The argument is, then, that punishment in general must be maintained in 
order to ensure that individuals will generally behave lawfully, even if sentences are 
maldistributed. The death penalty, however, must be eliminated because of its 
maldistribution. The reason for treating capital punishment differently, Nathanson 
(1985) claimed, is that the removal of the death penalty is “unnecessary for 
protecting citizens” as “the results of abolishing punishment generally would be 
disastrous, while the results of abolishing capital punishment are likely to be 












However, this sounds more like consequentialism than retributivism (see 
Chapter II). If the general judicial system is maldistributing sentences, this is 
justifiable if it has a significant enough deterrent effect. Pure retributivists are not 
interested in individual or general deterrent effects on potential wrongdoers, but 
rather, whether the desert claim of just punishment can be fulfilled (Brooks, 2004). 
“[T]he death of the murderer is justified not by its effects on other potential 
murderers, but by the murderer’s own moral guilt” (Reiman, 1983, p. 36; see also 
Primoratz, 1999). 
If the use of hybrid theories of retributivism and consequentialism, which are 
not completely void of value (van den Haag, 1985b; van den Haag, 1986), were 
permitted in this dissertation to justify abolitionism due to racial maldistribution, 
what Nathanson postulated may stand untouched. However, the inclusion of 
consequentialist or hybrid arguments cannot be used here if van den Haag’s 
challenge is to be met. 
 
VIII.IV. Concluding the Disguised Equal Distribution Response 
Racial maldistribution in capital sentencing results in a breach of the judicial 
authority’s mandate and thus its illegitimacy, which renders the death penalty unjust. 
Thus, abolitionism (i.e. equal injustice) seems preferable to a maldistributed capital 
punishment system (i.e. unequal justice). However, the response in this chapter 
indicates that, on retributive grounds, capital punishment is also morally just when 
the distribution is unbiased. How can the inherent morality of capital punishment 
change? For van den Haag, “improper distribution cannot affect the quality of what 
is distributed” (Stairs, n.d., para. 2). What is, in fact, addressed, is the inherent 
morality of the distribution of the penalty. The explicit illegitimate authority 
argument is not an argument to be used against van den Haag for the abolition of 
capital punishment due to inherent injustice, but is an argument against any biased 
distribution of any penalties in any criminal justice system (Brooks, 2004). 
 There is, in light of this view, little reason to suspect that the death penalty is 
the only penal sanction that is racially maldistributed and immoral in itself. One can 
eliminate most or all penal sanctions for the same reasons of illegitimacy and unjust 












overabundance of injustice as there would be no agreeable mandate or legitimate 
authority to administer just punishment and contain inevitable chaos and vigilante 
behaviour (Brooks, 2004). 
Alternatively, one could eliminate capital punishment due to racial 
maldistribution and retain all other sanctions because abolishing the death penalty 
would have only a minor effect on the citizens’ adherence to the law. This is, 
however, a consequentialist, or at the very least a hybrid, justification for the 
elimination of the death penalty. This is, of course, not permitted as an argument 
against van den Haag. If the criminal justice system and sanctions other than capital 
sentencing should be retained despite plausible biases (i.e. unequal justice), there is 
no valid retributive reason why capital punishment specifically should be abolished 
due to an innate immorality (i.e. equal injustice). The next chapter, and the fourth 
argument against van den Haag, indirectly addresses that notion by questioning the 
van den Haagian reason why the death penalty specifically should be retained or re-
introduced. Although all the counter-arguments in this dissertation have been 
presented in ascending order of strength, the final counter-argument, however, 













THE AXIOMATIC ASSUMPTION EXCEPTION ARGUMENT 
 
IX.I. Introducing the Axiomatic Assumption Exception Argument 
The disguised equal distribution response in the previous chapter highlights 
that the explicit illegitimate authority argument in Chapter VII is unable to find a 
valid retributive reason why the death penalty, specifically, is inherently immoral 
and thus should be eliminated (see Chapter VIII). In order for this chapter’s 
argument in this regard to be presented effectively, the van den Haagian axiomatic 
assumptions require some exploration (see Chapter V). 
Van den Haag challenged his opponents to prove incorrect, on retributive 
grounds, his claim that unequal justice is always preferable to equal injustice. As 
such, his first axiomatic assumption or main pre-condition was that no 
consequentialist or hybrid reasoning was permitted. This assumption shall not be 
interfered with, as the purpose of this dissertation is to accept van den Haag’s 
challenge and refute his claim by not using such hybrid or consequentialist 
reasoning. Similarly, his second assumption of non-comparative notions of 
punishment and desert are unaffected in so far as it exceeds the parameters of this 
dissertation. 
However, an aspect of van den Haag’s third assumption of proportionality 
shall be tested, the importance of which, as a principle for retributivism, has been 
highlighted throughout. It is not his general conception of desert and punishment 
(being proportional to the seriousness of the offence and culpability of the offender) 
that is examined, but rather, his assumption that the death penalty, specifically, is 
deserved for (first-degree) murder. Although it seems that the basis for removing the 
death penalty is particularly weak in the arguments presented in previous chapters, 
the foundation to retain that particular penalty is also questionable (see also Bedau, 















IX.II. Van den Haag’s Inference of His Third Axiomatic Assumption 
As mentioned, van den Haag’s third axiomatic assumption is that only (first-
degree) murderers deserve a capital sentence. However, if the death penalty should 
only be reserved for those that commit (first-degree) murder and “the most serious 
punishments are matched with the most serious offenses” (Murphy, 1979, p.79), 
there is an unconscious inference that the sentence of death is ranked as more severe 
than the sentence of life imprisonment (i.e. abolitionism or equal injustice). As van 
den Haag stated earlier in Chapter V, “death must be the greatest of punishments” 
because “life is the greatest of gifts” (van den Haag & Conrad, 1983, p. 225; see also 
Devine, 2000; Xinglong, 2005). 
There is, however, much debate over which sentence is more severe for the 
wrongdoer: life imprisonment or the death penalty (for examples, see Kvanvig, 
1993; Lavergne, 2003; Mujuzi, 2009; Penal Reform International, 2008; Stokes, 
2008). For instance, those with continuous run-ins with the criminal justice system 
may feel more mentally and emotionally equipped for, or comfortable with, prison 
life than a death sentence. Alternatively, there may be those who feel so devastated 
by (even the idea of) life in prison they would prefer death, and thus consider capital 
punishment less severe. A preference for the latter alternative is highly problematic 
for van den Haag. 
 
IX.III. Van den Haag’s Axiomatic Inference Problem 
Before addressing the problem that van den Haag’s assumption faces in this 
regard, it is important to comment on the offenders’ subjective experience of 
punishment. Many punishment theorists consider the offenders’ experience or the 
‘subjective view’ to be irrelevant with regards to punishment, whereby only the 
punisher’s perspective on the punishment is considered (see Corlett, 2004; Walker, 
1991). This is known as the ‘objective view’. However, retributivists, in particular, 
have tended not to analyse too deeply whether the severity of punishment should be 
understood in terms of a subjective or objective perspective (see, for a recent 












Similarly, although van den Haag “believe[s] the death penalty, because of its 
finality, is more feared than [life] imprisonment” (van den Haag, 1986, pp. 1665-
1666), it is unclear whether he believes death is a punishment more severe than life 
imprisonment because of a ‘mind-independent’ objective notion of finality, or a 
‘mind-dependent’ subjective notion of the offenders’ greater fear (see Nozick, 2001; 
Popper, 1972; Rorty, 1991). As such, unless otherwise contested by van den 
Haagians, this dissertation will assume that the offenders’ ‘subjective view’ of the 
punishment can be utilised in order to meet van den Haag’s challenge. Moreover, 
when the sentence of death is ascribed to an offender, the severity of that punishment 
is assumed by the punisher or judicial authority, which may be considered a ‘mind-
dependent’ subjective ascription of punishments in general. Thus the ‘subjective 
view’, one may argue, cannot be so readily dismissed when calculating the desert of 
the offender. 
In cases where the offender considers death less severe due to a ‘subjective 
view’, a problem arises for van den Haag against his claim that unequal justice is 
always preferable to equal injustice. For retributivism, the most severe punishments 
must be matched with the most severe offences (see Chapter II). However, if an 
offender considers and experiences a death sentence as being less severe than life 
imprisonment for the crime of (first-degree) murder, that core retributive principle is 
violated. As such, on van den Haagian retributive grounds, an injustice has occurred 
because of the imposition of capital punishment and the execution of a (first-degree) 
murderer. 
It is foreseeable that in spite of this, supporters of van den Haag may 
continue to defend the use of capital punishment in the belief that the general 
population views the death penalty as more severe than life imprisonment. Also, they 
may add the argument that “the advantages, moral or material, outweigh the 
unintended losses” (Stairs, n.d., para. 13). However, these death penalty supporters 
would seem, then, to adopt a utilitarian position, their argument being that ‘the 
greatest good (or utility) is for the greatest number of people’ (Rosen, 2003; see also 
Ostrow, 2002, for an interesting Wittgensteinian critique). This would replace 
retributive reasoning for a consequentialist justification of capital punishment, 












Alternatively, van den Haagians may suggest that there is no need to 
eliminate the death penalty in favour of abolitionism because, as in the case where 
there is racial maldistribution of capital sentencing, at least some offenders are 
receiving their just deserts which is far better than none. However, in that situation 
where only some offenders receive their just deserts, as opposed to all of them, the 
reason for retentionism is that if the distribution were equalised, abolitionism would 
have no foothold (Chapter VIII). It was not capital punishment that was deemed 
immoral in itself. In this case, however, even if the distribution were rectified as 
equal and balanced in terms of age, sex, race, religion, culture, nationality, and the 
like, there is still the matter of an irreconcilable inner subjective experience of capital 
punishment. 
Injustice, within this system, will definitely occur at some point, and so the 
death penalty will unavoidably and knowingly violate a core retributive principle. As 
such, capital punishment should be abolished (i.e. equal injustice), as it appears to be 
retributively immoral in se. In addition, for van den Haagians, life imprisonment is a 
viable option to replace capital punishment. Van den Haag refers to proportional 
retribution rather than the exact likeness of punishment to crime (or literal 
retribution, as shown in Chapter II), in his own analogy of fines for parking 
violations (in Chapter V). The reason why the death penalty specifically would be an 
exception is unsubstantiated. 
 
IX.IV. Concluding the Axiomatic Assumption Exception Argument 
This argument highlights subjective experiences. Van den Haag’s third 
assumption inferred that the death penalty is always experienced as more severe than 
life imprisonment (or abolitionism). However, in the inconclusive debate as to which 
penalties are worse, it is reasonable and foreseeable that some offenders would 
prefer to be executed than serve a term of life imprisonment, meaning that capital 
punishment – at any rate as far as they are concerned – is less severe. Van den Haag 
also suggests that (first-degree) murder is the most severe crime. In retributivism, 
certain principles need to be held concerning punishment, one of them being that the 
most severe punishment is matched with the most severe offences (see Chapter II). If 












this case – because retributivism is deontological and considers only the innate 
morality of punishment as described by these principles, capital punishment is 
designated as retributively immoral in itself. 
In Chapter VIII the argument presented was that equalising arbitrarily 
distributed or racially maldistributed capital sentences would render no violation of 
retributive principles. This chapter discussed the inner subjective experience which 
leads to an inevitable and knowing violation of retributive principles in spite of 
equalising distribution. Furthermore, without a more substantive retributive reason to 
specifically include the death penalty as a viable sentence, an acceptable alternative 
for the van den Haagians is a proportional form of retributivism, such as life 
imprisonment. Thus it seems that van den Haag’s challenge has at least in part been 
met as its refutation encompasses pure retributive reasoning, demonstrating that 
equal injustice (i.e. abolitionism or life imprisonment) may in fact be preferable to 
















Van den Haag lived long enough to witness judicial support for his 
conception of justice (Huigens, 2000). Remnants of his demand for justice and his 
extrication of appeals for equality are visible in numerous U.S. Supreme Court 
decisions (see, for example, McCleskey v. Kemp, 1987; Pulley v. Harris, 1984). For 
over three decades van den Haag restricted the perennial debate on the death penalty, 
belittled the significance of scientific evidence of racial inequalities in capital 
sentencing, and unapologetically ignored the very public neo-liberal discourse on the 
matter. 
For abolitionists, capital punishment is immersed within a strange 
contradiction. The power invested in the government and the judiciary is often 
distrusted and yet retentionists are willing to enhance that power by giving it the 
control over life (Sarat, 2002). Moreover, capital punishment is typically viewed via 
the media as a form of government control over some ‘vile’ members in the society 
for society’s sake, while abolitionists tend to claim that this judicial act is simply a 
form of brutal societal revenge (Zimring, 2003). 
Van den Haag, nonetheless, utilises individual moral desert to maintain his 
retributivist position for the death penalty. His position is that moral desert claims 
are satisfied even when offenders are given an arbitrarily distributed or racially 
maldistributed capital sentence. This is based on his understanding of moral desert 
and justice. He argued that justice is the aim of punishment and moral desert is the 
justification for that punishment. He further asserted that although the death penalty 
was unequally distributed among (first-degree) murderers, it still served greater 
retributive justice than if no murderers received their just desert, and was therefore 
always preferable. 
The ‘burden of relative disadvantage’ response revealed an internal 
inconsistency within van den Haag’s logic. This demonstrated, by way of van den 












arbitrary or maldistributed system endured greater disadvantages or additional 
‘costs’ when other equally culpable offenders were not punished. This was a 
perfectly valid argument except in the case of capital punishment, as there was no 
further burden to be endured by a person who had been executed. 
A death penalty process that distributes racially biased sentences from an 
authority that is illegitimate is unjust. As this dissertation demonstrated, however, an 
implicitly illegitimate authority via the response of the public was unsatisfactory. So, 
an explicit route to determine the authority as illegitimate was established due to the 
violation of mandates of impartiality. Although the offender’s moral desert is 
unchanged by racial bias, the illegitimacy of the authority and the capital sentencing 
process rendered the moral desert claims unsatisfied. Even if murderers deserve to be 
executed, sentencing by such an illegitimate source promoted further injustice as the 
original desert claims are not satisfied, and undeserved punishment or harm is 
administered. Here, unequal justice violated retributive principles. 
However, according to the van den Haagian assumption that offenders 
convicted of murder deserve to be executed by the state, the explicit illegitimate 
authority argument was inadequate and insufficient grounds to abolish the death 
penalty. The retributive principles that are violated are done so only because of the 
way that punishment is distributed. If the distribution were then equalised, the 
retributive principles would be seen to be no longer violated. As the inherent moral 
or immoral nature of capital punishment cannot change in the van den Haagian view, 
it is only the inherent nature of arbitrary or racially maldistributed sentences that is 
actually noted. There is no doubt that racial maldistribution in capital punishment 
must be dealt with, but discarding the procedure is not the key to this: discriminating 
against capital punishment in favour of desertion seemed unwarranted. 
Van den Haag may have assumed that the infinite nature of death far 
exceeded in severity a term of life imprisonment, but he failed to consider the 
wrongdoers’ subjective perspective on receiving and enduring these sentences. Due 
to this subjective view of severity, a difficulty arose in regard to situating capital 
punishment on a continuum of ‘punishment severity’, whereby the death penalty’s 
severity becomes virtually indeterminate (and not as self-evident, as van den Haag 












than life imprisonment for (first-degree) murder a core principle is violated, as the 
perpetrators of the most serious crimes do not necessarily receive the most severe 
penalties. Moreover, as this argument remains solid in the face of equalising 
distribution, and presents the viability of van den Haag adopting proportional 
retribution, capital punishment can be considered retributively immoral in se. Here 
capital punishment or unequal justice is not preferable to equal injustice (or life 
imprisonment, or abolitionism). This dissertation presented against the morality of 
the death penalty has thus met van den Haag’s challenge. It appears, then, that 
whether one refers to retentionist states, such as those in the U.S., or abolitionist 
countries, such as South Africa, there is no moral weight with which to impose 
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